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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Over the years, the world economy has experienced growth in foreign direct 
investments (FDI), with the role of developing countries becoming more evident 
as both recipients and investors alike.1 The proliferation of international 
investment has also led to more bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with their 
complex and often duplicated rules.2 
 
The increase in BITs of this complex nature has thus resuscitated a less publicly 
debated course, although recently discussed within the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is there need for multilateral 
agreement on investment (MAI),3 hosted within the multilateral institution(s)? 
 
Since the late 1990s, the discussion as to whether international investments require 
the MAI has been characterised by diverging interests of developed and 
developing countries, with neither willing to concede.4 Even in the immediate 
post-War II period, this standoff between developed and developing countries 
has dominated a discourse on whether there is a need for an international 
agreement on international investment. Yet developing countries, or African 
countries classified as least developing, continue to be left out of MAI discussions. 
For example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 1990’s proposed plurilateral agreement excluded African countries.  
 
Regardless of the direction that the MAI discussions take, the role of developing 
countries, including African countries, has become more important and more 
prominent than ever before. In fact, if the MAI ever became a reality, then it 
would seek to resolve some of complexities brought about by the current 
international investment legal regime – mainly in the form of bilateral investment 
                                                          
1UNCTAD Towards a new generation of international investment policies: UNCTAD’s fresh 
approach to multilateral investment policy-making (2016) 84-85. 
2Sullivan N and Salacuse J ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46, (1), 71. 
3UNCTAD, World report on Investment, (1996).  
4Sauvé J ‘Multilateral rules on investment: is forward movement possible?’ (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 336. 
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treaties – such as dealing with concerns around development objectives, the 
abuse of double taxation treaties and many other issues.  5   
 
According to Åslund, a formal multilateral discussion with a proposal about a 
possibility of a multilateral agreement on international investment was initiated 
by UNCTAD at the United Nations (UN) around the 1970s without success.6 
However, another formal process involving a proposal of a plurilateral agreement 
was established in the late 1990s by OECD countries.7 Nonetheless, France pulled 
out of the then OECD proposed plurilateral agreement.  
 
A plurilateral agreement allows fewer countries to conclude a multilateral treaty 
that may be incorporated into the international economic law and binding on all 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) member states.8 In pursuing a plurilateral 
agreement, the OECD hoped the process to be quicker than involving the entire 
WTO membership.9  
 
It was later suggested that the OECD MAI proposal to be part of the Uruguay 
round WTO agenda.10 Yet the proposal failed to gain momentum at the behest 
of critics from the poorest of the developing countries and some European Union 
(EU) countries.11 The OECD approach to MAI intended to cover various aspects 
and themes of treatment of investors and investment, investment protection, 
dispute settlement, exceptions and safeguards, financial services and taxations 
as areas in the agreement.12 However, the proposal failed to satisfy some of the 
OECD member states, more so the EU members on grounds of cultural 
differences.13 For example, France formally rejected the proposal citing failure by 
the proposal to consider the country’s sovereignty needs  on culture.14 
                                                          
5Double taxation treaty abuse: Developed countries investors are accused of manipulating double 
taxation treaty, in many instances leading to tax base erosion for developing countries who have 
often been international investment hosts. 
6Åslund A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) 04 Policy Brief, PIIE. 
7OECD negotiating group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment Draft Consolidated Text (1998). 
8WTO ‘Understanding The WTO: The Agreements ’ available at  
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm (accessed 30 November 
2017).  
9Åslund A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) 04-05.  
10Drabek J ‘A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics’(1998) Staff Working 
Paper ERAD-98-05 World Trade Organization Economic Research and Analysis Division. 
11Åslund A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) 04-05. 
12 OECD Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (1998).  
13France was quoted as having a problem with the certain form of the proposed MAI.  
14Kavaljit S ‘Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO’ (2003) Asia-Pacific Research Network 14. 
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Some of the aspects meant to be addressed in the MAI, are currently addressed 
through various BITs between developed and developing countries.15 However, 
taxation matters between the international investment hosts and international 
investors (or states) are in many, if not all instances, addressed through double 
taxation treaties (DTT), which also form part of international investment 
governance mechanisms.  
 
The DTTs are part of the process of facilitating international investment between 
international investors and host countries by ensuring that investors’ profits and 
related assets are not taxed twice by both their resident and investment host or 
source countries.16 The DTTs are also an incentive to both the international 
investors and international investment host countries to encourage more 
investment within the common and consistent taxation rules. The DTTs further 
protect the taxation base of the international investment host country by ensuring 
that taxation is fair for both contracting parties.17 Although the notion of DTTs 
protecting tax base has been contested before, the OECD report on action plan 
to address base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) has acknowledged that double 
taxation treaties lead to base erosion in many developing countries.18  
 
The 2008 global financial crisis led to many governments looking for revenue 
leakages as the global economy regressed.19 The abuse of international taxation 
rules and aggressive taxation planning by multinational corporations (MNEs) and 
other taxpayers were identified as amongst the activities, resulting in many 
governments losing taxation revenues.20 These abuses have intensified a debate 
on an international level about measures developed to deal with the abuses.  
 
These international discourses have resulted in a group of twenty powerful 
economies (G20) tasking the OECD to derive a mechanism to curb abuse of 
                                                          
15UNCTAD World Investment Report 1996 Investment, Trade and International Policy 
Arrangements (1996) 154-9.  
16Double taxation treaties provide for international taxation rules with an aim to avoid levying 
income or other forms of taxation on investors’ capital between investment host country and 
investor residence country. 
17Oguttu A, ‘Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa- Part 1: Africa’s Response to the OECD BEPS 
Action Plan’ (2016) 54 ICTD Working Paper 18.  
18 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (2013). 
19Cooper GS ‘Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse’, (2015) United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. 
20 Cooper GS ‘Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse’, (2015) United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. 
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double taxation treaties amongst other issues.21 Due to their dependency on 
extractive and mining industries in particular, developing countries, including 
African countries, have continued to be the main victims of the abuse of 
international taxation rules at the behest of MNEs as taxpayers.22 However, other 
economic sectors in both developed and developing countries are themselves 
not immune to the abuse of international taxation rules and aggressive taxation 
planning.23  
 
The argument is that due to an urge to attract more international investments, 
many of the African and other least developed countries tend to settle for 
unfavourable DTTs, for example, using the OECD model tax convention which is 
based on the residence principle.24 In other instances, countries tend to fall prey 
to abuse of international taxation rules by the MNE due to the lack of necessary 
human resources to deal with complex taxation issues. Other developing 
countries fell victims of international taxation law abuse due to weaker Institutions 
to deal with such abuse and to secure international investment.25 Contrary to 
intended objectives of the DTT,26 Baker has argued that the DTT does not affect 
the flow of international investment from developed to developing countries.  27   
 
South Africa, Kenya and Uganda are amongst African countries continuing to 
attract international investment. In addition, these countries have continued to 
use BITs and DTTs to attract and facilitate international investment inflows. 
However, these countries have also experienced abuse of international tax and 
investment rules as set out in DTTs and BITs, at the behest of the MNEs.  
 
                                                          
21OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013) 09-11. 
22UNECA, Investment policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016) 19.  
23Ault J and Arnold J ‘Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview’ (2015) United Nations 
Handbook Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries 01.    
24OECD model tax convention frameworks favours developed (OECD) countries needs mainly, like 
the income is taxed at ‘residence’ as opposed to ‘source’.  
25 Cooper G S ‘Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse’ (2014) United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. 
26The DTT’s main objective is to attract international investments by eliminate the minimisation of 
tax to be paid on capital or investment or return between two or more jur isdictions. 
27Baker P ‘An analysis of double taxation treaties and their effect on foreign’ (2012) (unpublished 
paper, University of Cambridge, 2012) available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/events/seminars-
schedule/conferences/peuk12/paul_l__baker_dtts_on_fdi_23_may_2012.pdf   (accessed 29th 
December 2016). 
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It is unclear as to how much the failure to enforce compliance of taxation rules 
by international investors and giving away unfavourable concessions is 
attributable to incentives attracting more international investments or to the lack 
of human capital and strong institutions. The OECD and G20 Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project report on Action 6: Treaty Abuse is criticised for its 
failure to contextualise the issues of developing countries, instead favouring 
developed countries.28  
 
At times, MNEs have been accused of being embroiled in treaty shopping, 
leading to many of the developing countries - often international investment 
hosts – setting up unfavourable double taxation rules and regimes.29 Hence, in 
their desperation to attract international investment, they are left to set up the 
DTT rules that lead to taxation base erosion.30  
 
The lack of multilateral agreements and a binding governance framework on 
international investment has exposed developing countries to abuse by MNEs, 
with rules on international taxation in particular. The current international 
investment regime, BITs, are useful for many countries. However, these rules are 
also seen mainly to protect international investors’ interests over those of the 
international investment host countries, including poor double taxation rules.31  
 
1.1.1. Governance of Investment Internationally and within Africa    
 
International investments and related transactions are currently governed largely 
by BITs, free trade agreements (FTAs) and other cooperation agreements. 
However, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
has recently32 reviewed its initial view33 from twenty years ago, where the 
institution noted that international investment laws (BITs, FTAs and others) were 
sufficient but now advocates that a multilateral agreement on investment is 
necessary. Currently, a framework on governance of international investment is 
                                                          
28Oguttu A ‘Tax base erosion and profit shifting – part 2: a critique of some priority OECD action points 
from an African perspective – preventing excessive interest deductions and tax treaty abuse’ (2016) 49 
(1)Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 154-156. 
29Treaty shopping, where the entities search for a country with low and favourable double taxation 
treaty, and such country is used as residence for the MNE. 
30Tax base erosion is the loss of government potential revenue as a result of taxpayers failing to 
declare all the profits and assets for tax liability. It could also be a result of taxpayers using tax 
legislation loopholes to avoid higher tax liability.    
31Ault J and Arnold J, (2015). 
32UNCTAD, Policy Framework on International Investment (2015). 
33UNCTAD, (1996).  
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being developed and proposed by UNCTAD.34 Although the UNCTAD 
development is a positive initiative that is long overdue, the policy framework 
should also aim to address specific issues relating to DTTs while the framework 
remains non-binding.  
 
One of the reasons cited by UNCTAD and other spectators’35 support for MAI is 
that ‘the balance of force’ between developed and developing countries has 
improved since the MAI discussions previously failed in the late 1990s. The UNCTAD 
initial doubts around the MAI were based on its reviews of the BITs, RTAs and other 
mechanism in place at the time.36 African countries have also seen an increase 
in FDI for the past two decades. This provides them with a strong case for 
protection from a multilateral investment system rather than the current 
arrangement. Kenya, South Africa and Uganda have seen an increase in 
investment, while all three countries use BITs and DTTs as mechanism to facilitate 
investments.  
 
1.1.2. International investment and Tax Treaty Abuse  
 
DTTs are international agreements used by more than one country or jurisdiction 
in economic cooperation to minimise impact and regulate against any 
unintended taxation consequences, like the double taxing of profits for the 
contracting states’ taxpayers. Two common DTTs models that are frequently used 
in developing taxation treaties:37 the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD-MTC) 
and the United Nations Model Tax Convention (UN–MTC)38 also see.39 International 
investors from OECD countries insist on the use of OECD-MTC regardless of 
whether the contracting state is a developing or developed country. 
  
In its conception, the OECD-MTC was developed to be used uniquely by the 
OECD member states.40 Yet international investors, often MNEs, those in favour of 
                                                          
34UNCTAD, (2015). 
35Berger A ‘Do we really need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German 
Development Institute. 
36UNCTAD, (1996). 
37Arnold A ‘An introduction to tax treaties’(2014) available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/TT_Introduction_Eng.pdf  (accessed 06 January 2017).  
38 UN-MTC uses source-base of taxing profits from international investments and favours capital 
importing countries. 
39United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries, 2011. 
40Daurer V and Krever, R ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD tax Policy models: An African 
Case study’ (2014) 07. 
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OECD-MTC when contracting with developing countries, are accused of abusing 
the international tax rules in various ways.41 Moreover, African countries with 
mining and extractive industries continue to accuse MNEs, and those residents of 
developed countries in particular, of abusing DTTs and processes.42 These treaty 
abuses lead to taxation base erosion while many developing countries lack 
human resources and strong institutions to defend themselves against such 
abuses.43  
 
Despite the lack of capacity, some developing countries, like South Africa, uses 
their own domestic process to combat the abuse of DTTs and to avoid deterring 
international investment. However, significant progress in getting MNEs to comply 
with DTTs, or at least to limit abuse, requires more effort from all stakeholders at 
multilateral level. The analysis of this mini-thesis research advocates instead that 
a binding multilateral legislative provision be considered on behalf of developing 
countries, - African countries in particular - in the governance of international 
investments. The legal provision suggested would thus provide a better guidance 
for double taxation agreements at the multilateral level.   
 
1.2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM  
 
A delayed global economic recovery since the 2008 global financial crisis, and 
the recent wave of a perceived protectionism44 of the global economy has 
resuscitated an “old or muted discussion” as to whether international investments 
require a global governance structure, in particular whether double taxation 
treaties are favourable for both international investors and host countries.45 also 
see.46 Developing countries, including African countries (e.g. Kenya, South Africa 
and Uganda), continue to cry foul on the failure by the current international 
investment agreement (BITs) regime to protect their right to attain development 
objectives and limit taxation base erosion by weaker or manipulation of DTTs. As 
a result, some countries have opted to withdraw from international investment 
                                                          
41Oguttu A, (2016).  
42UNECA, Investment policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016) 19. 
43Peter C, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, (2015), 379. 
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agreements (BITs), Ecuador is one of the recent cases,47 and enact domestic 
investment legislation.  
 
South Africa is also one such country, where the new domestic legislation on 
investment governance was recently enacted.48 also see.49 South Africa’s reason 
to enact domestic investment legislation has less to do with abuse of DTTs, but 
has to do with the country’s development objectives and other challenges 
brought about by international investments. Yet it is worth noting that the South 
African legislators recently identified abuse of DTTs by MNEs as an area to be 
strengthened to deal with taxation base erosion brought about by MNE’s doing 
business in South Africa.   
 
Multilateral governance institutions like UNCTAD, World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have recently called for 
other countries to reconsider to develop a MAI. For example, see50 also see.51 
However, the outstanding issues that led to failure of previous attempts for MAI 
would need to be addressed alongside some specific concerns by African 
countries. These include issues around the consideration of development 
objectives and concerns around fiscal losses as a result of abuse of DTTs being 
that these treaties are meant to facilitate international investments, one of the 
key concerns by African Union(AU)52  
 
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES  
 
This mini-thesis identifies areas of international investment and taxation rules set 
out in the IIAs and DTTs models that may be strengthened to address concerns of 
developing countries towards international investments; in particular, the African 
countries, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. I have noted a continuing 
international discourse regarding the need for MAI. Hence, this mini-thesis intends 
to contribute to these debates towards a better governance on international 
investments. 
                                                          
 
 
 
50UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance- 
Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu (2015). 
51WEF Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (2013).  
52UNECA, Investment Policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016). 
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The mini-thesis argues that African countries (for example, Kenya, South African 
and Uganda) may also require multilateral agreements on the investment regime 
(or rules on IIA) to cover anti-abuse of international taxation rules by international 
investors.  
 
This study makes further reference to the weaknesses of the current International 
Investment law (BITs) legislative framework as far as international investment flows 
into African countries is concerned. In fact, many African countries – including 
the African Union - are questioning the effectiveness of the current international 
investment regulatory framework in helping to address the continent’s 
development objectives. It is further argued that addressing weaknesses in the 
BITs should lead to a reformed multilateral investment rules accord, while African 
countries should contribute meaningfully when their concerns are taken into 
account in the process of obtaining MAI.  
 
This mini-thesis provides specific recommendations to strengthen the current 
international investment and taxation rules and make proposals for how a 
multilateral agreement on investment should be determined. The main research 
question in this study is: 
 
Can a Multilateral Agreement on Investment reduce Double Taxation 
Treaty abuse in developing countries? 
 
In addressing the main research question, the following sub-questions are 
analysed in the mini-thesis: 
 
 Do the IIAs and DTTs serving African countries (for example Kenya, South 
African and Uganda) support investment host country development 
objectives? 
 Is there adequate co-ordination between DTTs and lIAs with African countries 
(for example Kenya, South African and Uganda) and how could a MAI 
strengthen harmonisation? 
 How could a MAI (or a framework) strengthen DTTs to benefit the international 
investment host; in particular, developing countries in Africa?  
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1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This mini-thesis contributes towards the continuing international discourse about 
the governance structures of international investment and taxation rules. In 
particular, international investment legal framework may require multilateral 
agreement or legal framework to be considered fair, but also takes into account 
inputs from both developed and developing countries. The contribution of this 
mini-thesis is to identify weaknesses within the international investment law 
requiring resolution to enable better participation by African countries. In this 
mini-thesis, the historical development of the international investment legal 
framework is analysed to determine its relevancy in the current international 
investment climate. In particular, the suitability of the current international 
investment legal framework taking into account the original socio, political and 
economic climate of their development has changed. 
 
The mini-thesis analyses the effect the historical development of international 
investment regime on developing countries, in particular African countries. This 
analysis in used as an argument to ask as to relevancy of the current model on 
international investment rules, for example, is there a need to include 
consideration of the development objectives of investment host state as 
compulsory requirement.  
 
Three African countries, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda, are used as reference 
cases to explore research questions. These countries were selected based on the 
availability of their DTT and BTT literature, and that they have more developed 
frameworks on DTTs and BTTs compared to other countries in the Continent. All 
these countries are somehow in a process to reform their investment or taxation 
treaties,53 also see,54 and.55 Therefore, analysis their BITs and DTTs as reference to 
this mini-thesis contribute to broader discourse about the need to reform 
international investment and taxation legal frameworks. I also have access to 
these countries’ investment and taxation treaties information and their recent 
experiences with DTTs and BITs. This mini-thesis further uses these reference 
                                                          
53ActionAid ‘Double Taxation Treaties in Uganda Impact and Policy Implications’ (2014) . 
54Hearson M ‘Tax Treaties in sub-Saharan Africa: a critical review’ (2015). 
55 Olingo A, ‘Kenya revises double taxation agreement to attract investors’ (2016) available at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-revises-double-taxation-agreement-to-attract-
investors/2560-3307782-ag74l5/index.html  
(accessed 03 June 2017). 
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countries studies to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the rules of 
international investments; those related to DTTs in particular. Various multilateral 
institutions, including the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD and others, have written 
proposals, guidelines or policy papers regarding the possibility of a multilateral 
agreement on investment or non-binding guiding frameworks at a multilateral 
level. Some of these proposed legal prescripts and frameworks form the primary 
sources of this mini-thesis, including double taxation treaties and BITs from three 
African countries identified in the paper.  
 
1.4.1. Significance of the study 
 
According to Berger,56 for more than twenty years international stakeholders have 
pondered the governance of international investment. They have reflected in 
particular on whether to set up a MAI, who would be custodian of such a 
framework and how such an agreement would be implemented and monitored. 
Following the international discussion, wider research has explored the potential 
MAI and current legal instruments governing international investments,  while 
some of the legal prescripts have focused on the potential implications for 
developing countries. Such literature is used in this mini-thesis as a secondary 
analysis to support my arguments.  
 
The abuse of double taxation treaties by international investors has also been a 
part of the discussion and a lot of attempts have been made to try to redress 
challenges faced by developing countries in this regard. In recent years, the 
OECD and G20 BEPS project initiated in 2014 has published various reports and 
studies that seek to strengthen the international legislative regime dealing with 
taxation treaty abuse -and other issues - which seems to pose inherent problems 
to international investment. Hence, OECD and G20 BEPS project work has also 
formed part of the secondary analysis in this mini-thesis.  
 
As members of the WTO, three African countries - Kenya, South Africa and 
Uganda - are classified as either developing or least developing countries. Thus, 
if MAI is to be considered by the WTO as has been the case before, then the 
participation of African countries in the process would be important.  
 
                                                          
56Berger A ‘Do we really need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German Development 
Institute. 
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In the main, this mini-thesis analyse various legal frameworks within the domain of 
international investment and double taxation treaties since the formal proposal 
for MAI by OECD in the late 1990s until recently. In so doing, to contribute to a 
continue discourse as to whether the is need for MAI.   
 
1.5. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
To answer the afore-mentioned research questions, this mini-thesis will consist of 
five chapters. The proposed outline is as follows: 
 
 Chapter one: Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide the reader with a background to the study, including the 
research objectives and questions, while the research design and methodology 
of the study are also outlined. The chapter also provides a rationale for the study.  
 
 Chapter two: Global governance framework of International Investment 
 
A case for a multilateral agreement on investment continues to be made, despite 
scepticism on the part of some of the stakeholders. Such an argument can be 
presented by reviewing the current international investment legal framework. This 
chapter provides a critical analysis on the international investment agreements 
regime. The analysis is based on review outcomes by regional and multilateral  
institutions and the experiences of individual development countries. A snapshot 
of the existing literature further introduces issues around the international 
investment governance regime.   
 
 Chapter three: International Investment Agreements in Africa 
Like other developing countries, African countries have seen an increase in FDI, 
although the full potential is still to be realised. There are growing concerns that 
international investments also lead to a negative net effect between investment 
inflows and profit remittance outflow for most of African countries. In this chapter, 
I provide an analysis of the international investment agreements and reflect on 
areas for improvement limiting taxation base erosion for developing countries; 
Using three African countries, Kenya, South African and Uganda as cases of 
reference. 
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 Chapter four: Double Taxation Treaties and IIAs  
In this chapter, the study provides an analysis of various models of DTTs and how 
they are adopted by various African countries. The analysis provides further 
consideration of treaties susceptible to abuse by MNEs. The Chapter also provides 
an analysis of how to deal with the double taxation treaty abuse resulting from 
international investment.   
  
 Chapter five: What might work for African and other developing countries 
This chapter provides recommendations on plausible rules to deal with the 
concerns of developing countries and African countries in particular. The 
consideration of plausible reforms in international investment agreements is within 
the context that the current regime disadvantages developing countries as 
capital importing states. 
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CHAPTER TWO: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT  
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the current International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) regime and includes an examination of developments at 
multilateral level on the possibility of a multilateral agreement on investment. The 
development of international economic laws has led to more bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs),57 including BITs between developed countries, between 
developing countries, between regions and between developed and 
developing countries. In this chapter, an analysis of the usefulness58 of the current 
BITs structure for both developed and developing countries is also provided.  
 
In recent years, many developing and developed countries have continued to 
attract more FDI.59 However, as is argued in this mini-thesis, this proliferation of 
international investments forms part of the reason why a review of the multilateral 
investment regime is required, and why a MAI may be necessary.60 The review 
would also ensure that the investment governance framework takes into account 
developing countries concerns.  
 
In a way, the current global governance61 framework may perpetuate the 
protection of international investment at the expense of the development 
objectives of host countries. The main question is whether the governance 
framework of international investment needs to be reformed to take into account 
the interest of both the investor and host countries equitably. Hence, this chapter 
attempts to reflect further on challenges within the current BITs. 
 
Hearson argues that the structures of double taxation treaties resemble or 
symbolise the era or climate62 of their conclusion.63 For example, during the post-
colonial era, the former colonised countries gave up their fiscal space or tax base 
                                                          
57BIT and IIA are used interchangeably in this mini-thesis. 
58Usefulness as to whether the BIT structure leads to more FDI and whether developing countries 
development objectives are taken into consideration. 
59Åslund, A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) 01. 
60OECD 1998 support of MIA, UNCTA and others. 
61The phrase ‘global governance or governance’ appearing in this chapter and elsewhere in this 
mini-thesis refers to the legal framework prescribing rules between contracting parties to an 
international investment agreement. 
62Climate refers to international political, legal and economic environment. 
63Hearson M ‘Tax treaties in sub-Sahara Africa: a critical review’ (2015) Tax Justice Network African . 
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to their former colonisers in their DTTs.64 This mini-thesis author posits that the 
international investment agreements (BITs) are similar to DTTs in that they also 
reflect the era during which they were concluded. The UNCTAD analysis of the 
‘reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu’ also reflects upon 
the influences on international investment agreements by various political, 
economic and legal eras, including the 1950-1964 era of infancy, the 1965-1989 
era of dichotomy, the 1990-2007 era of proliferation and the 2008- era of re-
orientation. 65 If the theory about BITs or DTTs reflecting their era or climate is true, 
then the question is whether the current international economic, political and 
legal climate necessitate a reformed and inclusive legal or governance 
framework for the BITs or even a MAI.  
 
2.1.1. Investment in context  
 
In the context of this mini-thesis, international investment is defined broadly. In 
essence, investment is a procurement of interests in assets with the aim of deriving 
economic benefits or holding capital appreciation from ownership or control of 
interests in the assets as defined in international accounting reporting framework. 
The understanding and description of investment also includes procurement or 
concession of intellectual property rights and other intangible assets which may 
comprise of the rights to extraction of natural resources.66  Investment may be 
done by either buying physical assets or starting a business or purchasing 
securities in existing corporations.67 The procurement of investment may be done 
by either individuals, corporations, governments or non-profit organisations.  
 
The investment may be pursued by domestic investors leading, generally, to 
national (or investment host) regulations used to govern such investments or by 
investment may be purchased by international investors leading to international 
investment where international investment rules apply.68  
 
                                                          
64Hearson M ‘Tax treaties in sub-Sahara Africa: a critical review’ (2015) Tax Justice Network 
African. 
65UNCTAD, ‘Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu’ (2015) in World Investment 
Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 122. 
66Houde M ‘Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2006) OECD International 
Investment Perspectives, 148. 
67 International Financial Reporting Standard 3, Business Combination. 
68International Investment rules: could include BITs, Free trade agreements, international 
cooperation or any other regulatory or practice framework within the multilateral trade and 
investment system. 
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However, the international investment governance framework often prevails in 
the case of conflict with domestic rules. For example, many countries insist on BITs 
making provisions to use an International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) or contracting parties becoming members of the New York 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and 
other multilateral process, in the case of investment disputes as far as they 
exclude domestic rules or processes.    
 
2.1.2. International investment 
 
International investment refers to short or long-term purchase of assets-transfer of 
capital and direct investment in a host country by a foreign investor. This type of 
investment is also clasiffied as FDIs. As mentioned earlier, international 
investments are usually governed by international agreement rules or 
agreements on the part of both the investor and investment hosting countries. In 
particular, the investment treaty law, with various and specific legal instrumennts 
being used, is related to BITs, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other 
cooperative agreements.   
 
2.2. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
In trying to understand the structure of international investment governance, it is 
necessary to determine whether the international legal structure has its roots and 
origins in customary international law. Kishoiyian’s69 analysis of BITs argues that 
international investment governance frameworks fail to resemble international 
customary law insofar as BITs are concerned about the contracting parties’ interests. 
The Kishoiyian analysis further cited two International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases. 
Firstly, the Barcelona Traction Case70 where the court observed that due to continuous 
growth in inter-state economic activities, it is fair to expect an international law on 
such activities. In essence, Kishoiyian argues that the proliferation of BITs has delayed 
the creation of a customary international law on Investment. Secondly, he discussed 
the Right of Passage Case71 where the court held that provisions of BITs upheld by 
contracting parties forms local customary law and may as well be applied to other 
states. However, the principles of BITs are common, although some BITs may as well 
                                                          
69Kishoiyian B ‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law’ 
(1993) 14 (2) North Western Journal of International Law & Business, 372-73.  
70Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I.CJ. Rep. 3. 
71Right of Passage Case (India v. Port), 1960 I.CJ Rep. 4, 39. 
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be unique in serving the interest of contracting parties which differs from other BITs, as 
Kishoiyian notes.72 A multilateral agreement on investment may therefore be 
recognised as customary law, as opposed to the BITs.   
 
Unlike other international economic activities, such as  international trade, which 
is governed through a multilateral agreements of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), international investments are mainly governed by BITs between investor 
states and the investment host country or governed as part of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and other cooperation agreements.73 The use of BITs was, at 
its conception, meant as a measure to protect FDI during the post-colonisation 
era insofar as the former colonisers would use BITs with its past colonies.74  
 
The need to protect FDI may be traced back as early as the 18th century where 
the United States of America (USA) signed bilateral friendship treaties with 
particular countries in protection of their of interest.75 The USA experience was 
similar to that of West European countries insofar as many of them concluded BITs 
with developing countries principally to protect the investments of the residents 
of European states.76  
 
According to UNCTAD,77 but also based on growth in BITs,78 international 
investments continue to be governed largely by BITs in the twenty-first century. In 
view of the proliferation of the BITs over the years, I argue that, among other 
aspects, there is a need for a more unilateral or multilateral agreement to 
eliminate duplication and complexities brought up by BITs as their numbers 
increased and some overlap. Despite some of the recent BITs being driven by 
developing countries, many developing countries are frequently faced with 
having to convince developed countries to conclude favourable BITs, for 
                                                          
72Right of Passage Case (India v. Port.), 1960 I.CJ Rep. 4.  
73Sauvant K ‘The regulatory framework for investment: where are we headed?’ (2011) 15 
Research in Global Strategic Management, 411.  
74Sullivan N and Salacuse J ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 (1), 69 . 
75Åslund A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013) 03.  
76Vandevelde, K ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 Journal of 
International Law and Policy University of California at Davis. 
77UNCTAD Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu (2015) 122.  
78 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017 Chapter 1: Global Investment Prospect and Trends 
(2017).  
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example according to UNECA many African countries’ BITs are unfavourable to 
their development objectives.79 
 
A typical BIT covers various themes but common categories include the: scope 
of the treaty, conditions for the entry of the foreign investment, treatment of 
foreign investments, transfer of funds, operational conditions of the investment, 
protection against expropriation and dispossession, compensation for losses and 
investment dispute settlement.80 also see.81 Despite the existence of all these 
themes, there is a sense in the literature that the three main common themes in 
BITs and FTAs are treatment of international investors or their investments (also 
national treatment (NT)) and most-favoured nation treatment (MFN) investment 
protection and dispute settlement.82  
 
Hence, these three themes are continuously debated from the point of view of 
both the investor - often developed country - and investment host - often 
developing country - point of view. For example, however difficult it may be, 
international investment hosts strive for BITs which do not discriminate against 
domestic investors and vice versa; those in particular that take into account the 
developmental objectives of investment hosts.  
 
Basically, developing countries continue to be dissatisfied that international 
investment governance regime fails to reflect a reformed or evolved international 
economic and political community,83 where international investments are 
necessary for both the investment of exporting and importing countries alike.8485 
On a multilateral front, there is yet to be a global binding governance structure 
or framework or agreement for international investments, although the 
Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS) has limited 
governance provisions for trade-related international investment. The lack of a 
                                                          
79UNECA Investment Policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016). 
80UNCTAD, (2015). 
81Sullivan N and Salacuse J ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46, (1), 79 . 
82Åslund A (2013). 
83Reformed Economic and Political Economic - Unlike in the twentieth century, developing 
countries are looking to be allowed to participate in international investment regulatory framework 
on equal footing.    
84AU, Report of the meeting of trade senior officials. Eight ordinary session of the conference of the 
AU ministers of the trade (2013). 
85Berger A ‘Do we really need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German Development 
Institute. 
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multilateral investment accord is attributable, in part, to various failed attempts 
at both WTO and OECD levels to set up a Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI). These attempts date back to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, if not 
earlier, with the attempted establishment of International Trade Organisation 
(ITO) by the Havana Charter.86 Due to failure by the USA Congress to ratify the 
Charter, it has never come into force.  
 
The discourse on whether to establish a MAI followed another formal discussion in 
the late 1990s, where OECD member states negotiated a formal plurilateral with 
the intention that such an agreement would be adopted at a multilateral 
institution like the WTO. However, due to lack of consensus amongst the member 
states about the contents of the proposed MAI, the OECD proposed MAI failed 
to materialise. Vandevelde87 posits that the failure to uphold the then agreement 
is due to competing expectations and interests from OECD member states. In 
addition to Vandervelde’s argument, it is further posited that, the failure to 
uphold a proposed plurilateral agreement was due to the fact that most of the 
OECD member states lacked incentives to see through the agreement. This was 
due to the fact that most of the OECD member states economic interests in 
international investments were already protected within BITs investment hosts. 
 
In 2015, UNCTAD published their developed ’investment policy framework for 
sustainable development’.88 The framework was intended to be a guide for 
international investment agreements as they continue to grow. However, 
although the framework provides much needed guidance to improve the current 
BITs regime, its existence and success may be undermined by the fact that this 
policy framework is a non-binding policy document. However, in light of concerns 
failure to take into account developing countries’ developmental objectives in 
many of their current BITs, the UNCTAD policy framework makes provision that 
‘new generation’ international investments agreements should take into account 
the developmental prerogatives of developing countries.  
 
When applied to those parties concluding new or reviewing investment treaties, 
the policy framework could prove to create an environment of shift in BITs as they 
                                                          
86Havana Charter.  
87Vandevelde, K ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12, 185-6. 
88UNCTAD, (2015). 
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are known. Again, this framework development by UNCTAD raises a question of 
how far BITs should have been expected to provide for investments aligned to 
the development objectives of investment hosts. In line with previous 
expectations by international investment host countries, BITs were supposed to 
provide for development objectives.89 Hence it would be unfair if such 
expectations were at least not part of their BITs. On the other hand, perhaps BITs 
were meant all along to protect the interest of the international investment 
capital exporting countries, as they have been accused of doing with limited 
consideration of international investment importing countries. 
   
2.3. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO- IIAS    
  
It is clear from the analysis of the BITs literature that expectations vary towards 
setting up BITs from the points of view both of international investment exporting 
and the importing countries.90 Moreover, there is a lack of conclusive evidence 
that BITs do lead to greater international investment Table 3.1 in chapter three 
provides some evidence about the lack of conclusive evidence regarding 
impact of BITs on international investment growth.  International investment 
exporting states somehow expect that the BITs or FTAs provide protection for their 
investment from any potential expropriation by the international investment 
importing state, more so where the investor and host had had a colonial history 
prior to concluding the BITs.91 and also see.92  
 
The expectations of international investor states have been affirmed in the ICJ GL 
No 50/[1970]ICJRep 3, where the court held that the Belgium state had no legal 
right to claim losses for its citizen bond shares in the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company (BTLP)93 in Spain. Moreover, only Canada, which is BTLP’s state of 
incorporation, may claim for such losses against Spain. However, Canada has 
chosen not to pursue claims against losses suffered by its shareholders, including 
the Belgium residents. In essence, the ICJ has affirmed that, in terms of 
international law, investment host states are bound to provide legal protection to 
                                                          
89UNCTAD, (2015). 
90Malik M ‘South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties:  The same old story?’ (2010) IV Annual Forum for 
Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers,  
91Vandevelde K, (2005).  
92Malik M ‘South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The same old story?’ (2010) IV Annual Forum for 
Developing Country Investment Negotiators Background Papers, 1. 
93BTLP: Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd. 
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international investors and their investments. Despite Belgium lacking legal 
standing to seek protection for its shareholders in Canadian Company, Spain 
should provide such protection to international investors.   
 
The need for protection of international investment is founded in the post-colonial 
era,94also see,95 or the “era of infancy and dichotomy” to use the phrase coined 
by UNCTAD,96 insofar as the greater proliferation of BITs took effect after World 
War II.97 By advocating for the protection of their investments, international 
investment exporting countries expected retaliation from the former colonies for 
repatriation of their investment as a form of claim against colonial exploitation. 
On the other hand, the expectations of developing countries had been such that 
concluding BITs would lead to more international investments in their countries.98 
However, BITs have often sought to provide for favourable terms for international 
investor exporting states.  
 
Although there is inconclusive evidence of the effect of BITs on actual 
international investment behaviour,99 many developing countries, including 
African states, have competed to have as many BITs as possible. This trend has 
passed despite concerns that the designs of some BITs may present 
disadvantages for many developing countries, including taking away the 
sovereign right to regulate investments, unfair dispute settlement measures, 
failure to promote and facilitate investment, irresponsible investments and 
inconsistent application of international laws.100  
 
The concern about the effect of BITs on developing countries’ economies is in line 
with the African Union’s 2013 Conference, which was also concerned that the 
continent continues to conclude more BITs than before.101 There is limited 
evidence of replication of the BITs proliferation in the actual investments and 
                                                          
94Vandevelde, KJ. (2005), 161. 
95Åslund A (2013), 03. 
96UNCTAD, (2015),121. 
97Salacuse J ‘Historical Background of Tritification’ (2015) in, the Law of Investment Treaties Oxford 
International Law Library, 97. 
98Mosoti V ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on 
Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?’ 2005, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 26, (1),103-104. 
99Carim X ‘International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural Transformation: A 
perspective from South Africa’ (2015) 4 Investment Policy Brief, 3. 
100UNCTAD (2015). 
101AU, Report of the meeting of trade senior officials. Eight ordinary session of the conference of 
the AU ministers of the trade (2013). 
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developments.102 According to Salacuse and Sulliva,103 BITs have three main 
objectives: investment and market liberalisation, investment promotion and 
investment protection. Dispute resolution then overarches all these objectives.  
 
These themes are also similar to those noted by Mosoti’s three of four areas of 
BITs:104 the scope of application of the treaty, market access, establishment and 
investment protection and dispute settlements.  It is my argument that, as noted 
by Salacuse and Sulliva, the three BITs objectives fall short of recognising the host 
states of international investment, often developing countries, having 
expectations of more focus on their development objectives as noted in the 
UNCTAD 2015 report.105   
 
2.4. BITS OBJECTIVES 
 
2.4.1. Investment and market liberalisation 
 
Bilateral investment treaties, particularly between developed OECD states and 
developing countries are most frequently inclined to contain provisions 
guaranteeing investors and their capital access to the market of the investment 
host state with limited, if at all, government restrictions.106 Developing countries 
are thus expected to adhere to the concept of ‘market liberalisation’, which is 
continuously debated in the field of economic development.  
 
At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the liberation of markets is 
beneficial to the developing countries’ economies. Does liberating the market 
ensure that the development objectives of the international investment host 
states are attained? One school of thought is that liberating markets lead to more 
and better competition because international investors bring newer technology 
and better ways of producing, thus leading to better goods and service for 
consumers.107   
 
                                                          
102AU, (2013). 
103Sullivan N and Salacuse J, (2005), 79. 
104Mosoti V, (2005), 133. 
105UNCTAD 2015, international investment host state expectations, taking away the sovereign right 
to regulate, unfair dispute settlement measures, failure to promote and facilitate investment, 
irresponsible investments and inconsistent application of international laws . 
106UNECA, Investment Policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016). 
107Chang HJ and Grabel E, ‘Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual’ 
(2004).  
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The other school of thought is that liberating the market lead to MNEs dominating 
domestic industries and, in many instances, leading to the destruction of 
domestic and, at times, infant industries. Of course, there are multilateral 
instruments108 available to redress such ills. However, many developing countries 
lack money and other resources to use such measures to gain compensation.    
 
In drafting BITs, the sections of the treaty that provide measures to ensure access 
to the host state market place an emphasis on the fairly accessible NT and MFN 
principles. Most of the BITs between developing countries and developed states 
(in particular OECD members) provide for NT and MFN.109 Notably, Article 2 of the 
TRIMS also makes provision for these principles, although according to Article 4, 
developing countries are exempt from adhering to NT and MFN principles for a 
certain period.  
 
It may prove challenging to allow for Article 4 of TRIMS insofar as BITs are often 
negotiated instruments and once signed, have a long-term lifespan. Some 
developing countries may as well lack the necessary human capital and strong 
institutions for these negotiations. They are also desperate to compete with fellow 
developing countries to attract FDI. All these issues make it virtually implausible if 
not impossible for developing countries to negotiate on a level playing field with 
international investment exporting states.  
 
In a sense, international investors and their investments are to be treated in a 
similar way to domestic investors and, as required by the multilateral system, any 
preferential treatment conferred to any nations should be automatically 
conferred to all other international investors. Hence, the existing model for 
international investors investment provides for MFN and NT. Looking at it within NT 
and MFN, there is clearly a consensus at multilateral level for international 
investment and market liberalisation.  
 
However, developing countries are often given enough time to first consider 
whether international agreement at multilateral level are beneficial to their own 
                                                          
108The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Dumping and Antidumping 
Measures. 
109National Treatment: Imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally — at 
least after the foreign goods have entered the market. 
Most-Favored- Nations: Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate 
between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favor (such as a lower customs duty 
rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members . 
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development. In a way, it is within the prerogative of the developing countries 
during the negotiation of the BITs to ensure that their development objectives and 
other public interest issues are taken into account. According to Houde,110 the 
issue of liberalisation in BITs by OECD member countries has become more 
prominent. It is thus my argument that developing countries development 
objectives will continue to become important when considering the liberalisation 
of markets and investment.        
 
2.4.2. Investment promotion for the host 
  
Against the backdrop of otherwise inconclusive evidence on whether signing BITs 
leads to international investments, the expectation remains that ‘contracting 
parties’ to an investment treaty will seek to promote investment. In the case of an 
agreement between developed and developing countries, it is often the latter 
holding the higher expectations that, by conceding to the demands of 
developed countries, they will be promoted as the preferred investment 
destinations by the developed countries.111 Unfortunately, many developing 
countries are seen to go to even further lengths to attract international 
investment, including conceding or giving taxation relief, which leads to lower 
state tax revenue.112 The implication is that the development of infrastructure and 
the creation of jobs brought about international investment is more important 
than realising higher tax revenue from international investment profits.  
 
In its presentation of a 2015 investment report at an International Conference 
providing guidance for reform of international investment governance, UNCTAD 
noted that one of the lessons for reforming international investment rules is that 
the expectations for the BITs of being an investment promotion tool is 
misplaced.113 However, the Conference conceded that BITs could be used to 
serve multiple purposes within the investment host countries. For instance, they 
could provide certainty about the legislative environments for domestic 
investment or act to create domestic investment legislation if it does not already 
exist. The Conference further argued that instead of expecting BITs to promote 
                                                          
110Houde M ‘Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2006) OECD International 
Investment Perspectives, 176. 
111UNECA, Investment Policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016).  
112Chapter four of this mini thesis provides detailed analysi s on the double taxation treaties and 
effect on concession by developing countries and their revenues.  
113UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, (2015) 126. 
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investment for the developing countries, it is plausible for the international 
investment host states to promote development objectives within international 
investment. 
 
In contrast to UNCTAD’s guidance, Houde notes in an analysis of the BITs 
concluded by OECD member states with developing countries towards the end 
of the twentieth century that promotion of investment between the contracting 
states has become more prominent.114 Thus, international investment 
opportunities are commonly identified and shared with the member contracting 
states. However, the issue of investment promotion still fails to be an explicit and 
measurable requirement of BITs themes. Hence Appendix A,115 at the end of this 
mini-thesis gives the key themes covered in many of the OECD countries BITs.  
 
Protection of investment is mentioned as an objective of these agreements, as in 
many of the BITs it is part of the preamble. It is worth noting that many developing 
countries make additional provisions (for example, DTTs favourable to 
international investor) to promote international investment despite such measures 
being detrimental to the host country economy and fiscal position. In a way, 
protection of international investment is emphasised in BITs, regardless of having 
other provisions favourable to international investments.    
 
To take one case, due to the presence of international mining and extractive 
MNEs in Zambia, the country has both a BIT and double taxation treaty with 
Switzerland. The Zambia-Switzerland DTT prohibits the Zambian Taxation Authority 
from levying any withholding tax,116 on royalty, management fees and interest 
payment to Switzerland residents, also see.117 It has been argued that having this 
provision on the taxation treaty would limit Zambia’s ability to levy taxes on Swiss 
MNEs. Sadly, Zambia has struggled for the past few years or so to meet its 
sovereign debt obligations due to insufficient government revenues.118  
 
                                                          
114Houde M (2006), 177. 
115Appendix A: Substantive Issues covered in the OECD BIT Models. 
116Withholding Taxation- Is source base tax retention, and in the international agreements it is 
levied on interest, dividends, management fees and others income. Withholding tax is also used 
as an anti-avoidance or anti-abuse or both measure by tax authorities.  
117Hearson M ‘Tax Treaties in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Review’ (2016) Tax Justice Network, 12 . 
118Phiri D, Zambia headed for sovereign debt crisis, Zambian Watchdog, accessed online at 
https://www.zambiawatchdog.com/zambia-headed-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-
fundanga/comment-page-1/. 
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The point is not to suggest that the lack of government revenue in Zambia is 
entirely attributable to the DTT with Switzerland. However, the DTT with Switzerland 
disallows the taxation of withholding taxes, more so in the mining and extractive 
sector. which does affect the country’s ability to raise much needed revenue . 
Considering the reliance on the mining and extractive industry by the Zambian 
economy, such taxes could provide relief for Zambia’s government in meeting 
the country’s spending commitments. 
  
According to UNCTAD’s report ‘reforming the International Investment Regime: An 
Action Menu’,119 the work of BITs is contrary to the expectations of many developing 
countries. BITs are seen to fail to promote international investments and should instead 
be used to promote other interests of the investment hosts, such as aligning with FDIs 
for development objectives. The negotiation process of the BITs is therefore a critical 
stage for many developing countries. Hence, once the agreement comes into force, 
it is almost impossible to pursue development interests.            
 
2.4.3. International Investment Protection 
 
The protection or fair treatment of international investment is one of the original 
goals of the IIA during the post-colonial era or ‘era of infancy’.120According to 
UNCTAD, as different countries reaches their freedom from colonies, their BITs 
increased that protected international investment. The protection of international 
investment might prevent or redress harm by expropriating international 
investment. In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ held that the protection of 
international investment by investment hosts is expected because. As a result, 
Spain should provide protection to international investment similar to the 
assurance given to domestic natural and legal persons. In this case, however, the 
Belgium government was found to lack jus standi.121 In a way, the court found 
that the Belgium lack legal standing to seek protection for shareholders in the 
Canadian company based in Spain. This is despite finding that Spain should 
provide protection of international investment to avoid creating insecurities in the 
international economic arena.  
 
                                                          
119UNCTAD, (2015), 126.  
120UNCTAD, (2015).  
121Jus standi- legal interest. 
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To a greater extent, in redressing potential harm or the expropriation of 
international investment, BITs are aligned to dispute resolution as another form of 
guarantee given to international investors if dealt with at a multilateral 
institutional level.122 In this way, international investors may feel that disputes 
resolution process are unbiased.   
 
The Foresti Case123 provides evidence that the protection of international 
investment through the use of multilateral judicial systems is powerful indeed. In 
this case, South African government had introduced legislation124 which would 
have seen the interests of international and domestic investors in the mining and 
extractive industry being forced to give away up to twenty-six per cent of their 
shareholding to local communities.  
 
However, the international investor states of Luxembourg and Italy brought a suit 
against the South African government at the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). They argued that the legislation proposed to 
enhance local objectives would contravene their BITs with South Africa and the 
protection of their investments. This case was settled without a ruling by the ICSID, 
with South Africa conceding and losing funds as part of the settlement in favour 
of the international investor.  
 
Nonetheless, this case has led to a review of the current investment governance 
framework by the South African government with the result of withdrawing or not 
failing to renew most of the BITs with the EU125 and introduction of domestic 
investment law. The development of a domestic investment legal framework in 
South Africa is still in the process. However, the legislation favors a domestic 
dispute settlement mechanism over those at multilateral level. The South African 
government argues that current international disputes fail to recognize the 
sovereign right to legislate issues related to its development objectives.  
   
The protection of international investment is probably a well-developed aspect 
of the governance of international investment. Multilateral institutions, like the 
                                                          
122Dispute resolution, this is could either be state-to-state or investor-to-state dispute resolution.  
123Foresti case: In the matter of an arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Case No ARB(AF)/07/1. 
124Legislation introduced: Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) which is 
part of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 
125Mellersh N, No longer a fair game? access online at 
https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/5864-no-longer-a-fair-game. 
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ICSID or ICS126 are meant to resolve disputes related to international investments 
between international investors and investment hosts, as well as amongst 
contracting states. Based on the extent to which the protection of investment is 
addressed, at both multilateral level and that of the BITs, it is argued that this has 
also led to the proliferation of international investment agreements since the 
post-colonial era.  
 
It would appear that multilateral institutions dealing with international investors’ 
disputes about investments have been successful at protecting international 
investments. This success could be used as an example of the narrative arguing 
for multilateral agreement on international investment housed at one of the 
multilateral institutions.  
 
According to UNCTAD, the introduction of ICSID has led to an enhanced 
protection of international investment since the mid-1960s towards the 1980s. This 
occurred in the same period where an initial attempt to form a multilateral 
agreement on investment also failed.127 One can therefore posit that had 
attempts to strengthen protection of international investment at multilateral level 
failed, then this failure would have provided enough incentive to force a better 
discussion towards a MAI with interest in both capital exporting and importing 
countries. In a way, international investment exporting countries lack an incentive 
to bargain with investment hosts. Therefore, dispute resolution mechanisms could 
have been necessary measures employed by developing countries to advocate 
for MAI.    
  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that over the years BITs have increased between developed and 
developing countries and this proliferation may have led to duplication of some 
BITs or created a complex of international rules of international investments. This 
may be the explanation of why there has been an incentive to enhance 
discourses querying whether multilateral agreements on investment are 
necessary. The analysis provided in this chapter has revealed the importance of 
the international investment regulatory framework.  
 
                                                          
126ICSID or ICS- International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes or International-Court-
System. 
127UNCTAD, (2015), 122. 
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However, it is also clear that BITs continue to disadvantage capital-deprived 
countries which mostly happen to be developing countries. Bilateral investment 
treaties have continued to provide international investors with guarantees of 
protection for their investments, while making further provision for the use of a 
multilateral system in place for any disputes. However, these guarantees and a 
multilateral dispute resolution system may be at the expense of the development 
objectives of many international investment host countries.  
 
The analysis of the international investment regulatory framework shows that in 
their conception during the post-war period, the legal framework was very much 
influenced by the need to protect international investments from potential harm 
by host states. However, the need to protect international investment may 
perhaps still be necessary today. Nonetheless, there are other interests that ought 
to be considered for a fairer international investment law, such as the 
development objectives of developing countries. Perhaps an international 
investment legal framework should expand development objectives by 
deliberately ensuring that, as UNCTAD suggests, sustainable development could 
also be pursued through a multilateral accord. The lack of conclusive evidence 
as to whether more BITs lead to more FDIs certainly strengthens the case for 
consideration of MAI. Moreover, UNCTAD has also noted the need to reform the 
current international investment regulatory framework.  
 
Chapter three continues the analysis of the international investment governance 
framework with a focus on the African continent. The development of BITs on the 
continent will be analysed and further areas identified that support the 
development of MAI. As an additional instrument to promoting international 
investments in the continent as part of BITs, the advantages of double taxation 
treaties will also be highlighted before we provide a substantive analysis of DTTs 
in chapter four.    
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CHAPTER THREE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN AFRICA 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Like other developing countries, African countries have seen an increase in FDI 
128 although its full potential is still to be realised.129 Foreign direct investment 
records in 2014 show a growth of more than four per cent from just below three 
per cent over the ten-year period for the African region.130 However, there are 
concerns that despite the growth in international investment inflows in Africa, 
there is a more negative net-effect between investment inflows and profit 
remittance outflow for many African countries.131 In essence, money removed as 
return-on-investment by international investors significantly exceeds the money 
introduced as investment.   
 
In this chapter, an analysis of the BITs within the African continent is provided, with 
particular emphasis on areas for improvement to limit fiscal loses for developing 
countries. As part of our analysis of the BITs in the African continent, regional 
economic agreements, rules and their investment models will also be analysed. 
 
The growth of international investment agreements throughout the continent is, 
in part, encouraged by a continued increase in both the consumer market and 
levels of return on investment enjoyed by international investors.132 However, it is 
unclear how much growth in BITs in the continent provides more opportunities for 
more FDIs, although many international investors continue to use available BITs to 
protect their interest in investments to the continent.133 There is currently a lack of 
consensus from various economic analysis literature - econometric studies in 
particular - as to whether the available evidence supports a significant 
association between signing BITs and FDI.134  
 
                                                          
128UNCTAD, (2015). 
129UNECA, (2016). 
130UNECA, Investment Policy and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for regional 
Integration, (2016). 
131UCTAD, Economic Development in African, Rethinking the Role of the Foreign Direct 
Investment, (2005), 34.  
132UNECA (2016). 
133UNECA (2016). 
134Table 3.1. Summary of studies looking at the effect of IIA on FDI. In one column can be found 
studies that suggest significant association of correlation between increasing of BITs and FDI, and 
the other column shows studies suggesting a lack of correlation between increase in BTs and FDI. 
The last column shows specific studies showing African development of Bits and FDI. From these 
studies, it is clear that there is not conclusive evidence, even more so that most of these studies 
use similar datasets when looking at the study dates.   
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The lack of a conclusive consensus on the relationship between increased BITs 
and growth in FDIs is also replicated in African countries. However, many African 
countries are more concerned about a lack of consideration of their sovereignty 
in policy development and need to combat taxation base erosion in setting BITs 
with international investors. Hence, a multilateral agreement at a multilateral 
institution (s) may be well positioned to provide a much sought after fairer 
investment agreement regulatory framework.  
 
Table 3.1. Summary of studies looking at effect of IIA on FDI 
General Studies on IIA effect on FDI African exclusive studies on IIA effect on FDI  
no-Proof that IIA lead to FDI Proof that IIA lead to FDI no-Proof that IIA lead to FDI vs Proof that IIA lead to FDI 
UNCTAD -2008: No 
statistically significant 
relations BIT and FDI 
Egger and 
Pfaffermayer- 2004: BITs 
have a positive effect 
on FDI (developing 
countries) 
Banga- 2003: Lack statistical significant relations between 
BITs and FDI without other incentives   
Hallward- Driemaier- 2003: 
BITs do not generally 
increase FDI (developing 
countries) 
Salacuse and Sullivan -
2005: Strong positive 
effect of US BITs on FDI 
(developing countries) 
Grosse and Trevino- 2005: BITs have a positive effect on FDI 
(developing countries) 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman-
2005: No statistical relations 
between BITs and FDI 
(developing countries) 
Busse et al. -2008: BITs 
increase FDI flows to 
developing countries Gallagher and Birch-2006: No statistical significant relations 
without other incentives   
Aisbett -2009: no evidence 
that BITs increase FDI flows 
Kerner -2009: significant 
positive relationship 
between BITs and FDI 
flows to developing 
countries 
Egger and Merlo-2007: did not find any evidence 
suggesting that BITs have a significant influence on FDI 
Yackee -2008: no 
meaningful evidence that 
strong BITs lead to higher 
FDI. 
Berger et al. -2010: 
existence of a BIT 
increases bilateral FDI 
to developing 
countries UNCTAD- 2009: no evidence that BITs increase FDI flows 
Yackee- 2010: did not find 
any evidence suggesting 
that BITs have a significant 
influence on FDI   
 UNECA-2016 Empirical evidence unable to demonstrate 
association between BIT and FDI 
Sources: author, using UNECA and UNCTAD datasets, 2017  
 
3.2. IIA IN AFRICA 
 
In its 2013 report of the meeting of senior trade officials held in Addis Ababa, the 
AU135 raised concerns about a failure to attract more FDI even though more BITs 
were being concluded. The AU concerns were also directed at the international 
investment governance regime for failing to support the continent’s 
development objectives.136 As a result, the AU requested a critical analysis of the 
international investment regulatory framework to ensure these BITs contribute 
                                                          
135AU, Report of the Meeting of Trade Senior Officials. Eighth Ordinary Session of the Conference 
of AU Ministers of Trade, (2013) Addis Ababa, 21–23 October. 
136AU (2013). 
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towards the continent’s vision of industrialisation programmes.137 At the heart of 
the AU’s concerns is the extent to which current drafts of BITs are mainly based 
on OECD model investment138 between non-African countries and within intra-
African investment treaties.139 Yet this model investment has failed to address the 
continent’s developmental objectives. 
 
Non-African countries entering into BITs with African countries are beyond OECD 
member countries, being that countries like China, India and other countries have 
continued to enter to these agreements. Of course, these countries are 
considered developing countries according to the World Bank, but they continue 
to increase their BITs in the African continent beyond some of their OECD 
counterparts. The growth of BITs between African countries and non-OECD or 
developing countries further fits with Berger’s argument that a need to develop 
multilateral agreement on investment could gain momentum considering the 
economic strength of some developing countries like China and India.140  
 
The growth of BITs with non-OECD member countries is expected to surpass that 
of OECD countries. However, the BITs model investment used with African 
countries has its origin with the OECD model, even if both China and India also 
have their own BITs model investment treaties while many African countries use 
them.  
 
3.2.1. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures - Africa 
 
The TRIMs guidelines to the investment measures are related to trade in goods. 
TRIM applies to the forty-two African countries which are members of the WTO, in 
particular Article 2 on the application of NT and quantitative restrictions and 
Article 8 on the consultation and dispute settlement. However, Article 4 provides 
for developing countries to deviate from the provisions of Article 2. Hence, all 
African member states are developing countries and may opt for to use Article 4. 
Therefore, in concluding BITs, African countries may choose to deviate from NT 
provision on trade-related investments to cater for their development objectives.  
 
                                                          
137AU, (2013).  
138OECD model investment, (2013). 
139AU (2013).  
140Berger A ‘Do we really need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) German 
Development Institute. 
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However, according to UNECA,141 in their attempt to attract or compete for FDIs, 
African countries continue to follow international norms of protecting 
international investment, while also providing preferential treatment at the 
detriment of their own development. It is clear that following international norms 
on BITs provides consistency and certainties to international investors. However, 
African countries could also benefit from making their investment treaties 
counterparties aware of their concerns about developmental objectives at a 
multilateral level.  
 
The reform policy framework proposed by UNCTAD also encourages developing 
countries to take advantage of multilateral provisions, and do so by aligning their 
BITs or models to their development initiatives.142 However, the UNCTAD 
framework is neither enforceable nor prescribed. Thus it would be fair to expect 
that the new generation of BITs regime between developed and developing 
countries would take into account development issues; unless, of course, a 
multilateral investment accord was to be established at a multilateral level 
enforcing adherence to development principles.    
 
3.2.2. OECD-Framework and Africa BITs 
 
In 1976, the OECD developed a declaration of its member countries, 
predominantly developed countries, to improve the investment climate, 
encourage the positive contribution MNEs can make to economic and social 
progress.143 This declaration forms the legal basis although non-binding of the 
OECD international investment treaty models. The declaration was reviewed in 
2011 to reinforce the OECD and the MNEs commitments to provide guidelines for 
MNE, NT, conflicting requirements and international investment incentives and 
disincentives.  
 
The declaration is an open agreement144 to non-OECD countries and some 
African countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, who are signatories to the 
declaration. Having this declaration shows a commitment by OECD countries to 
a fairer investment environment for both international investors and hosts. 
However, given the lack of consideration for developing countries objectives, the 
                                                          
141UNECA, (2016), 08. 
142UNCTAD, (2015), 126. 
1431976 OECD declaration on international investment.  
144Open agreement, a non-binding agreement by OECD member states. 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
41 
 
OECD may need to go beyond having a declaration or making the declaration 
to be legally binding and provide specific measures for redress in cases of non-
compliance by its member states and their MNEs.  
 
Under the OECD declaration guidance to MNEs, there are specific taxation 
contribution responsibilities prescribed for the MNEs, including that the “MNE 
should comply with both the letter and spirit of the tax law and regulation in 
countries in which they operate”, which includes providing information as 
required by the tax authorities. The emphasis on compliance to taxation rules is 
an important guideline for OECD MNEs, as many have been accused of abusing 
taxation practices globally.145  
 
However, since the declaration is non-binding, making its compliance the 
prerogative of the member states defeats the purpose. In this case, the unbinding 
nature of the regulatory mechanism may incentivise MNEs from OECD to opt for 
compliance at a time suitable to them; more so, as far as repatriation of their 
capital is concerned.146 In concluding their BITs with the OECD member countries, 
African countries may use these declarations as a guideline. However, the fact 
that the declaration is non-binding mainly encouraging good practice by MNEs.  
 
In addition to this OECD declaration, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) also provides support to as many as fifty-three African states,147 
while MIGA is meant to provide support and promote FDI in developing countries. 
Accordingly, like many developing countries African countries use various 
measures to attract international investments in their economies, including use of 
BITs and DTTs.  
 
African countries have access to these OECD and MIGA provisions to strengthen 
the governance of international investments. However, in spite of these 
provisions, many African countries’ investments treaties with OECD countries are 
still unfavourable to the investment hosts. These consistently unfavourable 
investment treaties may be explained by BITs negotiated between the two states 
with their own interests in mind. However, power dynamics or bargaining power 
                                                          
145OECD Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties - Action 15 - 2015 Final 
Report (2015). 
146OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 - 
2015 Final Report Action 06 - 2015 Final Report (2015). 
147MIGA; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 
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in these negotiations and desperation to attract more international investments 
by African countries continues to produced BITs that do not appeal to the hosts’ 
development needs.  
 
The Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/07/0,148 demonstrate the effect of unfavourable BITs for 
developing country’s objective. In that, South Africa could not pursue its 
development objectives as result of BITs it had with developed countries .  
 
3.3. REGIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES- OR FTAS 
 
Individually and collectively, African regional economic communities (RECs) are 
meant to provide governance structure for international investments within the 
regions and the continent. The RECs have also signed their regional treaties and 
cooperation that deals with the investment issues regionally. For example, the 
South African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Finance and 
Investment, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 
supplementary Act adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities 
for their Implementation, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) – or the Common Investment Areas and the East Africa Community 
(EAC) – and the East African Community Model Investment Code.  
 
Every region has a governance framework for international investment: 
investment agreements binding to member states, regional free trade 
agreements with investment chapters and investment agreement models. The 
EAC-Model Investment Code, was developed in 2006, with Part II149 Section 5 of 
the code ‘National Treatment and Non-discrimination’ providing for NT  and Non-
Discrimination for international investments.  
 
Section 14, ‘Protection from Deprivation of Property’, then provides protection 
from expropriation of assets, unless such expropriation is in the public interest. 
Section 15, ‘Settlement of Disputes in Respect of Registered Investment’ provides 
that dispute for investment be resolved using national laws and processes, with 
the exception of disputes related to investments that have certificates branding 
them significant investments according to the government process, where such 
                                                          
148Case No ARB(AF)/07/1. 
149EAC Model Investment Code, 2006: Part 11 (Section 5): Right of Establishment,  Establishment 
Procedures, Operation, Protection and Benefits of an Enterprise. 
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investments disputes shall be in accordance with the rules of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
 
According to the code, the dispute mechanism is also meant to promote 
international investment with the regions by an agency under section 15 and 18 
of the model. The EAC-Model Investment Code is not legally binding, as it serves 
as a model for national legislation.150  
 
In the ECOWAS common investment market vision151, Articles 5, 6 and 8 provide 
for protection of international investments under the titles of national treatment, 
most-favoured-nation treatment and expropriation respectively. Article 33 
provides for dispute resolution between the investor and host state using the 
national process and courts, failing which disputes should be resolved using a 
national process and courts, while the ECOWAS court of justice should be 
approached as the last arbiter.  
 
As with model investment for other regions, the COMESA Investment Agreement 
for Common Investment Area152 provides for adherence in dealing with 
international investment disputes in Article 6,153 then providing for national 
treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment and expropriation in Articles 17, 19 
and 20 respectively. In addition to the protection provisions in the other 
mentioned regions, the SADC Protocol for Finance and Investment (FIP),154 
provides for the right for member states to regulate for public interest under 
Article 14. The amended the SADC FIP, 2016 is in-force, it further limits the 
compensation to international investors in case of expropriation of their 
investment, if such expropriation is in the public interest.   
 
Looking at the regional model investment frameworks of Africa’s main economic 
regions, one can posit that they are mainly modelled around the OECD model 
investment model framework with less consideration given to the enhancement 
of development objectives. Indeed, UNCTAD’s155 reform report notes that BITs 
negotiation should be in line with developing countries’ development goals. It is 
                                                          
150UNECA, Investment agreements landscape in Africa, (2015).  
151ECOWAS Common Investment Market Vision, (2008).  
152COMESA Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area. 
153Article 6, International Multilateral Agreements.  
154SADC protocol for finance and investment, as amended in (2016), though its status of entering 
into force is unclear.  
155UNCTAD, (2015). 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
44 
 
more worrying that the regional model investment frameworks were all 
concluded within the 21st century. Nonetheless, they still reflect the 20th century 
investment model as far as developing countries development mandates are 
concerned.  
 
The assumption would be that concerns related to the lack of inclusion of 
development objectives and dealing with issues of taxation base erosion and 
more favourable terms for African countries will be prioritised. However, the 
investment codes for the regional models are primarily to provide a governance 
framework for international investments with fellow regional member states 
(model investment provides for non-regional member state).  
 
The international investors make use of treaty shopping156 to benefit investors from 
developed or OECD countries with regional agreements. For example, due to its 
low tax regime and as a member of the two SADC and COMESA economic 
regions, Mauritius can attract MNEs to set up regional offices and invest in the 
African continent. The setting-up of bases in Mauritius by MNEs certainly benefits 
the BITs of the Mauritius regional and other preferential treatments awarded 
within these regions.  
 
Despite having regional model investment agreements, concern remains within 
the African continent that a continental framework on investment would perhaps 
be desirable for simplicity, avoiding duplications and minimising fiscal losses.157 
The continental governance framework on investment may also ensure that 
African countries development objectives and other issues like lack of ‘strong 
institutions’ and capacity to negotiate international agreements are addressed.  
 
Many African countries lack the sufficient and necessary human capital, skills and 
strong institutions to negotiate, uphold and implement international agreements. 
These weaknesses were also echoed by Busse et al.158 that developing countries 
should rely on BITs as a form of institutional support in case where countries lacks 
necessary ‘strong institutions’. However, reliance on BITs as a guiding framework 
where domestic laws are either weak or non-existent was initially refuted by Mary 
                                                          
156Treaty shopping: an instrument of international tax planning by International Taxpayers seeking to set 
base at a jurisdiction with law tax rate. 
157UNECA, Investment agreements landscape in Africa, (2015). 
158Busse M, Königer J and Nunnenkamp,P ‘FDI Promotion through Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
More Than a Bit?’ (2010).   
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Hallward-Driemeier.159 Developing countries should not use BITs to supplement the role 
played by internal institutions to avoid sole reliance on international legal frameworks. 
Mary Hallward-Driemeier argues that reliance on BITs as the main legislative 
framework often delays developing countries in establishing their own domestic 
institutions, while exposing those countries to abuse by international exporting 
countries.   
  
The other main issue that is not addressed well within the international investment 
governance framework are taxation issues; in other words, how would a return on 
investment be taxed by the international investment hosts. Of course, the idea is 
not to isolate international investments from domestic legislation like taxation. 
Thus, unlike domestic investors international investors rightfully repatriate their 
profits and other assets. It is therefore argued that international investment 
requires a unique taxation structure as currently provided by the international 
taxation law.  
 
In the African regional models and the protocols on taxation measures, not all 
the regional legislative investment frameworks make specific mention of 
compliance to taxation measures by international investments in particular. All 
the regional agreements make provision that compliance to domestic laws like 
taxation should be prioritised before international profits and assets are 
transferred out of the host countries. However, under Article 20 and 23 the 
COMESA makes specific provision for taxation measures to which international 
investment ought to adhere. In a way, this requires compliance to regional laws 
over those of municipal laws. Hence, the SADC FIP160 makes the provision that DTT 
between member states and other countries aims to eliminate the probabilities 
of double taxation amongst members. 
 
3.4. GOVERNANCE AND DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES 
 
As binding international agreements, double taxation treaties are used by 
international investors and host states to eliminate and remove potential double 
taxation161 insofar as income and other assets in international transactions are not 
                                                          
159Hallward-Driemeier M ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment?’. 
160SADC-FIP, the original and amended version provides guidance on taxation issues for its 
members, with the amended version emphasising on double taxation treaties with the region. 
161Brauner Y, Pistone P, BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination (2015) IBFD . 
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double taxed between the investment host state and investor country.162 
Accordingly, the DTTs are intended to lead to trade-offs between loss in taxation 
revenue by international investment host state (often developing countries) with 
the potential to attract further FDI from the international investor (often 
developed countries) as a return for fiscal loss.163 As with BITs, conclusive evidence 
is lacking as to whether these DTT arrangements lead to more FDI from developed 
to developing countries. However, various studies suggest there is  compelling 
evidence that the current DTT regime leads to abuse of international tax laws, in 
particular leading to taxation base erosion for many countries.164 
 
The findings of a study by Neumayer165 suggest that, using their OECD model tax 
convention experience, middle-income developing countries that have signed 
DTTs with the USA have increased investment more than low-income group 
countries. Arguably, the model of DTT used between the contracting parties 
affects the developing and developed states differently. For example, the UN 
model benefits developing countries more than the OECD model.  
 
In essence, double taxation agreements are governed by two main common 
conventions: the OECD Model Tax Convention and UN Model Tax Convention. 
International investor states and investment hosts use these two common taxation 
treaty models globally to eliminate the possibility of double taxation. These 
models are discussed in detail in chapter four. To summarise, the models are 
mostly similar as the UN model was developed based on the OECD model being 
the oldest model. However, a key difference between the models is that in the 
OECD model, the taxpayer (international investor) income and other assets is 
taxed from their residence base166 while in the UN model, the taxpayer (or 
                                                          
162Barthel F, Busse M and Neumayer E ‘The impact of double taxation treaties on foreign direct 
investment: evidence from large dyadic panel data’ , Contemporary Economic Policy (2009) 28 
(3) 369. 
163Steenkamp L ‘The Permanent Establishment Concept in double Tax Agreement Between 
Developed and Developing Countries…’ (2014) IJEBR 548 . 
164OECD/ G20 BEPS project reports. 
165Neumayer, E ‘Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing 
countries?’ (2007), 43 (8) 1501. 
166Residence base: this simply refs to the taxpayer (investor) being taxed from their resident. In 
practice, this issue has proved difficult to determine as many conditions are used by both the 
investors and investment hosting states.  
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investor) is taxed from the source base167. Basically, when countries enter into a 
DTT, they use one of the two as a model to draft and develop their DTT.    
 
The OECD model is used by their member states168 in their DTTs with developing 
countries. This model is preferred insofar as most of the international investors are 
residents of OECD countries. In that sense, the investor states’ tax base would be 
virtually guaranteed to be high even though the business activities take place in 
other jurisdiction - the investment host state. This is probably the most simplified 
way of describing the situation, but it still gets to the point.  
 
As mentioned earlier, chapter four provides a detailed analysis of these tax 
models. Considering the need for fiscal space, many developing countries would 
prefer to use the UN model as that guaranteeing a higher taxation base for their 
countries, since the investor is taxed on the source which is often, the developing 
countries’ area. However, in fear of losing out on potential and further FDIs, where 
the intention should otherwise be to incentivise international investors to provide 
more FDIs, developing countries often settle for the OECD model tax convention 
to satisfy the preferences of international investors. However, there is a sense that 
some developing countries do prefer using the OECD model tax convention 
despite having a choice to use the alternative UN model.     
 
The common use of the OECD model tax convention between developed and 
African countries is demonstrated in a record of the DTTs between African 
countries and OECD countries. The use of DTTs within African countries has not 
been as prevalent as its use beyond the continent between African and non-
African countries. The DTT regime was introduced in international law around the 
same period as the BITs regime become popular; that is, in the 1960s during the 
post-colonial era169 also known as era of infancy and dichotomy.170  
 
                                                          
167Source base: In contrast with the residence base, source base refs to taxing of the taxpayer 
(investor) from the source of generating income. Basically, income is taxed by the investment 
hosts, mostly developing countries.  
168OECD member states: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, German, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of 
America.  
169Post-Colonial area: A period after the end of colonialization between less developed and 
developed countries. This era refers the effect on the former colonies. 
170UNCTAD, (2015). 
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However, there are fewer DTTs by African countries in comparison with the BITs  in 
the continent.  Although the League of Nations had already developed principles 
of international tax in their model convention in 1927.171 According to UNCTAD, 
by the year 2016 there were more than 2750 BITs and 2894 DTTs internationally.172 
In these statistics, African agreements account for 854 BITs and 400 DTTs. From this 
analysis, it is clear that DTTs are less prevalent than BTTs in Africa because, 
internationally, the number of BITs compares fairly well with DTTs agreements.  
 
Despite the proliferation of intra-African BITs, there are fewer intra-African DTTs as 
many of these tax treaties are either concentrated within fewer African 
countries,173 while more treaties are concluded with non-African and developed 
countries. This is ironic, insofar as most African countries are in need of fiscal space 
if they are to deal with continued demands for development. Hence, proper 
international taxation laws that protects an African countries’ tax base would 
provide for much needed fiscal space.   
 
Of course, there are complexities that justify low DTTs in the African continent; for 
example, the lack of strong institutions or taxation or legal authorities and human 
resources capacity to negotiate and enforce DTTs by many African states. 
Taxation is inherently a complex concept and BITs do not necessarily lead to more 
international investments. However, the lack of proliferation of DTTs similar to BITs 
in the continent may, in part, be beneficial to international investors, in that the 
assets and profits may be repatriated without hurdles like paying taxes. This has 
proven able to reduce the tax base of the investment hosting states and, on the 
other hand, inflate the tax bases of the investor’s resident state tax base.174  
 
Certainly, failure to generate enough tax revenue by developing countries from 
international investment has not pleased African countries. Hence, the AU has 
recently raised concerns around the lack of favourable international economic 
law for its member states.175 Many studies176 are commissioned to redress the 
                                                          
171Avi-Yonay R ‘A perspective on supra-nationality in tax law’ in BRICS and the Emergence of 
International Tax Coordination (2015) IBFD 33.  
172UNECA, (2016),16. 
173DTTs intra-Africa- Mauritius, South Africa and Tunisia account for most of the DTTs in the African 
continent.  
174Neumayer E, Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing 
countries? 2007, 8. 
175AU Conference of Trade Ministers (2013). 
176AU studies commissioned to find a solution to the problem of the tax abuse. 
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problems by stretching both international investment law and taxation regimes in 
the continent.  
 
The OECD and G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project may also have 
heeded the concerns of the AU and other parties about abuse of international 
tax legislative regime by jointly commissioning a study coined the ‘BEPS Project in 
2014’,177 whose recommendation reports were published in 2015. In one of the 
reports that supports the development of multilateral instrument to modify 
taxation treaties,178 it is noted that some provisions in the current taxation treaty 
regime perpetuate taxation base erosion, for example, use of resident-taxing 
approach over source-taxing approach with developing countries. In some 
instances, DTTs do not lead to non-taxation at all, leaving both investor resident 
and investment host states without any tax revenue.  
 
Many countries, including developing countries, are expected to adopt the BEPS 
and G20 BEPS projects when negotiating the DTTs.179 However, it is worth noting 
that the BEPS project was criticised for its failure to include developing countries  
in decision-making process, Africa, notably, is in the process of reviewing the tax 
treaty regime,180 insofar as such processes should have been conducted at 
multilateral level entailing that the victims of the poorly negotiated DTTs are 
predominately developing countries - mining and extractive industries in 
particular. 
 
3.4.1. Inter-Regional DTTs 
As an attempt by the African continent to strengthen governance in its 
international taxation regime, many inter-regional double taxation agreements 
are currently in force.181 Out of 400 DTTs in the African continent, 85 DTTs are inter-
regional taxation treaties in the continent.182 These intra-regional treaties are 
meant to harmonise taxation with intra-regional investments between member 
states. The intra-regional treaties might seem few compared to international 
statistics, but it is noted that some regions are inter-linked, for example, COMESA 
                                                          
177BEPS project 2014. 
178OECD ‘Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 - 2015 Final 
Report’ (2015) 15-17. 
179OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013).   
180Oguttu, A (2016).  
181UNECA, (2016),   
182UNECA, (2016), 16. 
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has both members of SADC and EAC like Kenya has both EAC and COMESA. 
Therefore, since some of the regions have other agreements and cooperation, 
like free-trade agreements or custom unions, one would expect few tax treaties 
will be in place.  
 
However, the question is whether this is sufficient and serves the purpose of 
considering the proliferation and review of old BITs in the continent. COMESA-
EAC-SADC have more DTTs at 32 than other intra-regional consensus, with Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) having fewer intra-regional treaties at 4.183 This points to 
the concern that DTTs are concentrated in certain countries or regions in the 
African continent and that lack of capacity and institution by other African 
countries would benefit from multilateral agreements.      
 
There are more than fifteen countries in each intra-regional DTT, making a 
stronger case for these treaties as gaining in strength over bilateral treaties. Of 
course, the intra-regional tax treaties are used by their member states and these 
agreements are between developing countries in Africa. Unlike the DTTs with 
OECD or developed countries, the intra-African regional taxation treaties are 
drafted based on the UN model taxation convention.  
 
Table 3.2. Intra-regional DTTs in Africa 
 
Sources: UNCTAD, 2016  
  
                                                          
183Table 3.2 Intra-regional DTTs in Africa, adapted from the 2016 UNCTAD report gives 
comparative statistics on intra-regional taxation treaties.  
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3.4.2. African countries with DTTs  
 
Fewer African countries184 make use of both BITs and DTTs to govern their 
international investments and to harmonise taxation issues between both the 
African and non-African countries. According to the UNCTAD database as cited 
by UNECA,185 there are more African-Africa double taxation treaties than for 
Africa-to-non-African countries.186 This disparity could either reflect the willingness 
to negotiate more with fellow African countries, although Mauritius is seen as a 
taxation haven for many MNEs and has more DTTs that those motived by these 
MNEs, or that the African-African DTTs are mainly used as part of continental or 
regional requirements. There are more than two-hundred DTTs between thirty-five 
African countries, with Mauritius, South Africa and Tunisia collectively making up 
more than a third of all DTTs in the continent.187  
 
However, there is a sense that such agreements fail to lure in more international 
investments as at least one of the main objectives.188 The question is whether 
conclusion of these agreements is in line with the developing countries 
developmental objectives insofar as potential and harmful implications are often 
underplayed, such as taxation base erosion. The other point is whether 
developing countries leaders are coerced into concluding these treaties without 
sufficient understanding of the fiscal and technical implications for their 
countries.189  
 
In essence, the process of negotiating and concluding the DTTs at the ‘political 
level’ is always required to be within the context of taking into account 
development objectives, as that would also ensure that the FDIs attracted also 
support African countries’ development paths.190 It is argued that some of the 
DTTs between Africa and developed countries lack economic substance 
                                                          
184African countries with 6 or more DTTs: Algeria-10, Botswana-6, Ivory Coste-6, Egypt-7, Mauritius-
26, Senegal-8, South Africa-28 and Tunisia-19.   
185The UNCTAD database was cited in the UNECA, report, (2016). 
186 Non-African countries in this case refers to OECD countries. 
187African countries with 6 or more DTTs: Algeria-10, Botswana-6, Ivory Coste-6, Egypt-7, Mauritius-
26, Senegal-8, South Africa-28 and Tunisia-19.   
188UNECA, (2016),16. 
189UNECA, (2016), 16. 
190Kasoko E ‘Why and how Africa should extend its network of double taxation treaties with China’ 
(2014) available at https://africlaw.com/2014/03/17/why-and-how-africa-should-extend-its-
network-of-double-taxation-treaties-with-china/  
(accessed 17 April 2017). 
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because there is no international investment flowing between both parties to the 
treaties.191  
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
 
African countries continue to receive international investment from both 
developed or OECD and other developing countries  like China, including intra-
African investments. The growth of international investment is expected to 
increase further as the continent continues along its development path. The AU 
has also noted that the continent’s development is dependent on investment 
that aligns with development objectives. Hence, to ensure alignment of 
international investment with the continent’s development objectives, the AU is 
looking to reform governance framework of international investment flowing into 
the continent. 
 
In awakening these concerns, African economic regional bodies have reformed 
their model international investment treaties and have recently reviewed their 
regional investment agreements. Most of these governance frameworks are 
aligned to international norms and make use of multilateral institutions for further 
guidance; in particular, over dispute resolution, including those in OECD models. 
There is clearly support for African countries and regions to make use of their 
municipal courts in dispute resolution. However, provisions for multilateral system 
are available in most of the international investment models.  
 
The analysis of these frameworks has shown that there is limited consideration of 
the specific provisions included to address African continent development issues. 
These provisions may also include combating taxation base erosion leading to 
loss of much needed government revenue.  
 
Loss of tax revenues with the intent to attract more international investment is one 
of the key problems facing African international investment regulatory models. 
The use of double taxation treaties is a fairly new concept in many African 
countries due, in part, to lack of human capital and strong institutional capacity. 
However, even those African countries using DTTs to limit double taxation of 
international investors’ profits continue to lose fiscal space. The African continent 
may hence benefit from a multilateral investment agreement that is overseen by 
                                                          
191Oguttu, A (2016),18.  
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a multilateral institution; more so if fiscal loss resulting from international 
investment is also combatted at multilateral level. 
 
Chapter four provides an analysis of double taxation regimes and agreements to 
identify areas within the regime that leads to the taxation base erosion due to 
international investments and related activities. Loopholes identified in the 
double tax regimes will then be used to provide recommendations to strengthen 
both the case for a multilateral investment agreement and the need for the 
double taxation regime to be improved to account for developing countries’ 
development objectives.  
 
Here, three case studies are used as reference for in-depth analysis in some of 
the specific areas of international taxation rules to demonstrate the weakness 
and opportunities for strengthening international legal frameworks. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES AND IIAs  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this chapter, an analysis of the various models of double taxation treaties (DTTs) 
and how they are adopted in different countries is provided, with particular focus 
on developing countries, specifically African one. The analysis here provides 
further consideration of DTTs susceptible to abuse by MNEs, at the behest of 
developing countries as international investment hosts. In strengthening an 
argument about the weakness in the current DTT regime, a historic overview 
about the development of International law of investment and taxation treaties 
is also given.  
 
This chapter provides further analysis of the recent OECD and G20 BEPS project 
outcome that has led to a development of a multilateral instrument (MLI) to 
modify double taxation treaties.192 In conclusion, the chapter attempts to explore 
areas of weakness in both DTTs and BITs to argue for a stronger role to be played 
by multilateral governance institutions to provide a multilateral legal framework 
that strengthens international economic law in this regard.  
 
As far as international investment is concerned, the assumption193 and 
understanding of the purpose and role of the double taxation treaties (DTTs) and 
BITs, continues to receive criticisms from scholars194 also see,195 and further see,196 
developing countries and, in recent times, developed countries.197 In particular, 
the backdrop of inconclusive evidence shows that the current models of BITs and 
DTTs have led to more FDIs for developing and African countries. Despite a lack 
of conclusive evidence, the international investment outcomes for AU member 
states continue to disappoint.198  
 
Furthermore, despite the lack of consensus in the literature whether having more 
DTTs lead to increased international investments, it would appear that the DTTs 
                                                          
192OECD and G20 BEPS Project, the project.  
193DTT assumptions: Amongst others include that they facilitate free movement of capital, goods 
and services. 
194Dagan T, (2000). 
195Daurer V and Krever R, (2012). 
196Hearson, M, (2015). 
197OECD and G20 BEPS 2014 Project has seen OECD and G20 countries criticising the failure by 
the current taxation treaty regime to alleviate abuse of international tax rules leading to non-
taxation.    
198UNECA, (2016), 10. 
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between the OECD countries and developing countries has led to higher taxation 
base erosion for the latter; or, at least, some DTTs between developed and 
developing countries have led to a lower tax base for developing countries (often 
international investment hosts).  
 
On the other hand, the fiscal losses to the developed or mainly OECD countries 
seem to be more neutral compared to the developing-to-developed.199 Although 
at times, according to the OECD and G20 BEPS project, the DTTs lead to non-
double taxation200 and at times non-taxation due to MNEs manipulating the 
international tax rules to avoid tax liability even at their residence.201 Hence, the 
BEPS project recommended a review is, by BEPS project, of the current double 
taxation treaties to deal with the abuse of international taxation rules. These 
manipulations are endured more by international investment hosts, often 
developing countries, than developed countries or OECD member countries. 
 
In principle, a double taxation treaty offers cost-and-benefits for contracting 
parties.202 Apart from those main intended objectives, amongst the benefits203 
brought about by the DTT includes ensuring compatibility of taxation laws 
between ‘contracting parties’, improv ing taxation revenue collection and 
increasing supply of taxpayer information, reducing opportunities for non-
compliance with taxation laws, increasing international investor certainties and 
improving relations between international investors and residence and host-
counties.204 Some of the costs, including loss of fiscal space, has also reduce the 
tax base for the net-capital importers due to the concessions allowed within 
international taxation rules.  
  
                                                          
199Dagan T ‘The tax treaties myth’ (2000), International Law and Politics Journal, 32 (939) 43-51. 
200Non-Double Taxation relates to an outcome of abuse of international tax rules by MNEs, whereby 
both the residence and source countries are unable to impose taxation on the international 
investors’ profits on income. 
201OECD ‘Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 - 2015 Final 
Report’ (2015) 15-17. 
202Contracting Parties, include both the residence state- country that is the resident of the 
international investor who is more often than not a developed economy and net capital 
investment exporter - and host state - a country of the international investment host who is often 
a developing country and often net capital investment importer. 
203DTT main objectives are to eliminate or reduce double taxation and encourage cross -border 
investments. 
204Dagan T, (2000),46.  
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4.2. MODEL OF TAXATION TREATIES- UN AND OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTIONS   
 
The introduction of international income tax law dates back to before World War 
I, when many countries started levying taxes on income. The prevalence of 
jurisdictions imposing income tax increased as international investment 
transactions grew after the First World War.205 At the initial stage of developing 
international tax rules and use of customary international law, many countries 
opted for unilateral approaches of taxing foreign income and capital. In the 
unilateral approach, governments use domestic legislation and policies as tools 
to offer tax-credit for foreign taxes paid.206  
 
Although there are still many countries using the unilateral approach in dealing 
with taxation accrued to cross-border transactions, including the USA,207 even 
more countries have opted to use international taxation rules (treaties 
predominately). The Vienna Convention on treaties does apply to taxation 
treaties,208 as Article 2 provides that a treaty is an international agreement 
between states that is governed by international rules. In her criticism of the 
taxation treaties weakness,209 Dagan has supported the use of the unilateral 
approach to serve the purpose210 meant to be addressed by double taxation 
treaties. This argument responds to concerns that the current international 
taxation rules and investment treaties benefit more the net-capital exporting 
states than the net-capital importers.  
 
There are various conventional taxation treaties in existence, including estate 
and inheritance taxation treaties,211 a multilateral convention on mutual 
assistance in tax administrative matters,212 taxation on Information exchange 
agreements (TIEAs) and other international agreements with tax treatment provisions. 
The double taxation treaties convention models of the OECD and UN are the two 
main taxation treaties adopted by many countries compared to other international 
                                                          
205Daurer V and Krever R ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy models: An African 
Case Study’ (2014) AJICL,04. 
206Dagan T, (2000), 05. 
207Marian O ‘Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse: A Functional Approach’ (2016) University 
of Florida Law Faculty Publications, 1160-16. 
208Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969. 
209Dagan T, (2000), 05. 
210Double taxation treaties intend to provide certainty to the MNEs in terms of international taxation 
rules used to impose taxes on profits and other income.   
211 United States-Switzerland Estate and Inheritance Tax Treaty ,1959, 9/17/51.  
212ARNOLD, B, (2015).  
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treaties dealing with tax matters. In essence, these are more influential as many 
countries’ taxation treaties are based on one of the two.  
 
These two model taxation conventions were developed in different years to guide 
international tax law. The OECD model taxation convention was developed in the 
earlier 1960s, while the UN model taxation convention is based on the OECD model 
and was created around late 1980s, coming into effect around the late 1990s. The 
development of these models was preceded by events and the interests of both 
OECD countries and developing countries within the UN respectively. 
 
The OECD model taxation convention has succeeded other similar treaties, which 
were considered either unfit for purpose or failed to address the interest of capital 
exporters over those of capital importers or vice versa. The earlier taxation model, the 
Mexico model, which was developed during the Leagues of Nations era in 1943, 
allowed or conferred source-countries or international investment hosts213 taxing-rights 
over international investment transactions214 contrary to the current OECD model 
taxation convention.215 Due to dissatisfaction on the part of developed or OECD 
countries about the Mexico model, in particular that taxing rights were given to 
capital importers over the exporters, another model was created later in 1946 to be 
known as the London Model which became common used for more than twenty 
years.  
 
The London Model’s implementation success was attributable to the model satisfying 
the concerns of the developed countries raised during Mexico model, by granting 
taxing rights to the resident countries,216 which were predominately capital-exporting 
countries.217 Post-World War II, around the late 1950s and earlier 1960s saw the 
development of the OECD model taxation convention, mainly based on the London 
Model and partly adopted some aspects of the Mexico Model.  
 
                                                          
213Source or Investment hosts:  In the context of this paper referring to the developing countries; 
in particular, African countries, as they are mainly net-capital importing states. 
214Taxing-rights: In the current OECD mode tax convention, the taxing rights are granted to the 
resident countries, often capital-exporting countries.  
215Daurer V and Krever R, (2014), 04. 
216Residence countries - These are countries that are mainly exporting capital, in the context of the paper, 
also to be developed countries or OECD countries. 
217Daurer V and Krever R, (2014) 05. 
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The OECD model tax convention is intended to support its member countries’ 
objectives,218 as this model limits the rights to tax international profits by source-
countries or net capital-importing countries compared to Mexico Model.219 However, 
it would seem the model was meant to be used amongst the OECD members 
anyway.  
 
If the argument holds that the OECD models are meant for its members, then the fiscal 
losses of using residence-based approach would be relatively nil since OECD member 
countries would be source-countries with importing capital, or residence-countries 
when exporting capital to fellow OECD member countries insofar as OECD member 
states would be both importing-and-exporting capital.220 The OECD model taxation 
convention is still in place in the twenty-first century, although the recent OECD and 
G20 2014 BEPS project is intended to reform these rules to address the base erosion 
and profit shifting (fiscal losses) experienced by many countries both developed and 
developing.  
 
The post-development of the OECD model taxation convention era in the 1960s saw 
a proliferation of DTTs amongst the OECD members, although non-OECD member 
states were also part of concluding taxation treaties with OECD countries based on 
their model tax convention. In the main, the objective of reforming the OECD model 
tax convention is perpetuated by continuing growth in international tax competition, 
leading to greater non-double taxation in many instances. The tax competition led to 
more and more countries lowering their corporate taxes. Hence, this led to MNEs 
moving their residences to low tax rate jurisdictions. The irony for tax competition is 
that the low tax regime does not translate into more decisions to increase investment 
either.221  
 
                                                          
218The OECD Model Tax Convention is based on residence tax base; since most of the OECD 
members are capital exporting countries, their MNE profits are taxed in their residents.   
219Daurer V and Krever R ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy models: An African Case 
Study’ (2014) AJICL, 04.  
220Residence-based tax treaty amongst net-capital exporting countries often leads to nil as far as 
fiscal losses. This is due to the fact that both treaty contracting parties are incentivised to invest in 
each other. However, the negative effect exists in case where the other contracting party is a net-
capital importing in that the exporter- the capital export would benefit from residence taxing 
rights.     
221A study of OECD tax regimes by the economist journal argues that lowering corporate tax 
rates doesn’t translate to more investment either - The Economist, Getting the most out of 
business taxes-changing rates does not make a lot of difference, 2017, accessed online at : 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21723407-changing-rates-does-not-
make-lot-difference-getting-most-out-business. 
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The late 1960s not only saw growth in DTTs, but according to UNCTAD,222 the failure of 
the customary international law (CIL) to contain international investment disputes and 
a lack of appetite to reach consensus about the MIA proposed in the Havana 
Charter,223 also led to the proliferation of international BITs.224 This take-off and growth 
in both BITs and DTTs era was also dubbed the post-colonial era, as this was the same 
period where the post-decolonisation of many developed countries entered into 
international investment agreements with their former colonies.  
 
South Africa is also an example supporting the notion of the post-colonial period, 
insofar as more than eighty-five per cent of the country’s taxation treaties were 
concluded post-apartheid, which was in 1994.225 Many reasons were cited for the BITs, 
but certainly one of the main motives for these treaties was, and it is still to a greater 
extent today, to protect the international investor or former colonisers interests. There 
were more BITs between developed (those from Europe) and developing countries; 
in particular those from Africa, Asia and Latin America, during the era of mid-1960s 
and late 1980s.226  
 
It was in this era is that DTTs also grew substantially. It is argued that here international 
investors, in particular those from OECD countries, were willing to export their capital 
to developing countries. The question is whether this proliferation of the BITs suggests 
correlation or causality between flows of investment and certainty brought about by 
international rules provided by both DTTs and BITs. Or is this mainly indicative of 
invertible process of post-war era where international trade and industrialisation were 
expected to increase?  
 
The OECD model tax convention continues to influence taxation treaties, including 
between developed and developing countries. The latter countries have also 
continued to raise concerns regarding their tax revenue losses associated with the use 
of the model. This concern may well be misplaced in that the OECD model was never 
meant for developing countries but mainly to function between OECD members 
states.227 At this point, the role of multilateral governing institutions or instruments would 
                                                          
222UNCTAD ‘World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance’ (2016) 
122-124. 
223Havana Charter, (1948). 
224UNCTAD, (2016) 122-124. 
225Hattingh J ‘South Africa’ in ‘the BRICS and the emergence of international tax coordination’ 
(2015)237. 
226Havana Charter, (1948). 
227Daurer V and Krever R, (2014) 05. 
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come into question. Hence, the Mexico Model, which was seen to be biased towards 
developing countries, remained within the then multilateral institution of governance, 
Leagues of Nations. Developing countries raised concerns (as they still do today) 
about their losses of tax revenue brought about by the taxation concessions in the 
OECD model.228   
 
The UN established a team of tax experts (Ad Hoc Group of Experts) from both 
developed and developing countries to develop an alternative model tax 
convention after the late 1960s.229 The work of this ad hoc group led to the 
development of the UN mode tax convention, which primarily attempts to balance 
the taxing rights of the taxation treaties on both developed and developing countries, 
although the UN model is seen to favour giving taxation rights to source compared to 
residence countries. Accordingly, the UN model tax convention has been in place 
since the late 1980s.  
 
Between 1997 and 2013, there were more DTTs signed that included UN model 
provisions, more so by developing countries. According to Arnold, in the study 
commissioned by UN to assess the uptake of the UN model tax convention, there was 
more uptake of the share taxation rights on the provision of royalties than most of the 
other twenty-seven provisions.230 However, there were few countries that allow source 
countries’ rights to tax royalties and this included the treaties between developing 
countries. 
 
The provision on share taxation rights in Article 12 (1) and (2) of the UN Model Tax 
Convention reads:  
 
(1) Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the 
other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.  
 
(2) However, such royalties may also be taxed in the Contracting State in 
which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the 
recipient is the beneficial owner of the royalties, the tax so charged shall 
not exceed... per cent (the percentage is to be established through 
bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of the royalties. The 
competent authorities... (Emphasis added) 
 
In this assessment, out of more than 1800 taxation treaties assessed, more than eighty-
per cent of the taxation treaties gave low taxing rights for royalties to source or capital 
                                                          
228Daurer V and Krever R, (2014). 
229Arnold, J (2014). 
230Arnold J ‘Tax Treaty Monitor, The UN Model in Practice’ (2014) IBFD, 129 . 
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importation countries.231 It is ironic that many developing countries still opt to use the 
OECD model tax convention when entering into taxation treaty with OECD countries 
or relinquish their taxing rights despite using UN Model tax convention. This begs the 
question of whether developing countries use the OECD model tax convention as an 
incentive to attract more international investments despite inconclusive evidence to 
support the notion, as noted by UNECA.232  
 
On the other hand, is it due to the lack of necessary skilled negotiators or strong 
institutions on the part of developing countries as noted by the UNCTAD,233 and Bussse 
et al234 and by Daurer and Krever.235 As for these countries it is rather easy and 
accessible to opt for OECD approaches and rely on their capital exporting countries 
institutions. Perhaps, both points raised are applicable as reasons for the continued 
use of OECD model tax convention despite its disadvantage to non-OECD member 
states and for developing countries in particular. As much as the issue of which model 
tax convention is in use is complex, the role of multilateral governing institutions, like 
the WTO or UNCTAD, has never been so important and profound in setting up the 
international governance framework of international investment and taxation.   
 
The international rules on taxation, like the BITs, are very much crafted or 
developed in terms of the perspectives of the capital exporter against the 
importer. This view is reflected in the development of the model tax convention 
itself, with the OECD aligned to its members by giving taxing rights to capital 
exporters and the UN supporting capital importers who are largely developing 
countries.236 The OECD and G20 countries have, since 2014, embarked on a 
process of redressing the weakness within the treaty regime that has led to a loss 
tax revenue due to the abuse of international taxation rules and aggressive tax 
planning.237  
 
This OECD and G20 process is also considered to be a taxation treaty reform 
process.238 In particular, this process also deals with taxation treaty abuse that 
                                                          
231Arnold, J (2014), 129. 
232UNECA, (2016). 
233UNCTAD, (2015). 
234Busse, M, Königer J and Nunnenkamp, P, (2008). 
235Daurer, V and Krever, R (2014), 06. 
236Arnold J ‘Tax Treaty Monitor, The UN Model in Practice’ (2014) IBFD . 
237Brunton L ‘The OECD/G20 Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project - Informed perspective’ available 
at  http://www.thesait.org.za/news/255947/The-OECDG20-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-BEPS-
project--an-informed-perspective.htm (accessed 01 November 2017). 
238Oguttu, (2016). 
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lead to non-taxation. However, this process is criticised for failing to include 
developing country representation, more so being that the net-capital importers 
in these countries have suffered more revenue losses as a results of double 
taxation treaties abuses compared to developed countries or net-capital 
exporters,239 also see.240 For this process to be seen as more representative, the 
role of the UN and other multilateral institutions may have to be strengthened.  
 
Looking at the trends and origins of the international taxation rules, it is argued 
that the importance of international economic law is never in doubt, more so as 
far as international investment and taxing rights thereto are concerned. However, 
the continuous contest for taxing rights and, by extension, regressive redistribution 
of taxation revenue from developing to developed countries certainly cast doubt 
with regard to the effectiveness and relevancy of current international 
investment and taxation framework. 
 
4.3. DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES – AFRICA - KENYA, UGANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA  
 
4.3.1. Issues for developing countries 
 
The Kenyan and South African double taxation treaties with developed and 
OECD countries241 dates back to their respective pre-(1960s) and post-colonial 
(1970s) areas. In contrast, Uganda’s double taxation treaties network were mainly 
concluded towards the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.242 In addition to having concluded taxation treaties after the 
development of the UN model, Uganda has in recent years embarked on a 
process of reviewing its double taxation treaty structures which stand in contrast 
to the Kenya and South African taxation treaties as predominately modelled 
around OECD taxation convention.243  
 
Uganda has even gone to the length of delaying further ratification of new 
taxation treaties as part of reforming its taxation treaty regime. The delays are 
due to concerns from the Ugandan government that the state is unable to raise 
much needed tax revenues from some of the MNEs taxpayers, being that DTTs 
                                                          
239Hearson M ‘Developing Countries’ Role in International Tax Cooperation’ (2017), 04 -06. 
240 Oguttu A ‘Tax base erosion and profit shifting – part 2: a critique of some priority OECD action points 
from an African perspective – preventing excessive interest deductions and tax treaty abuse’ (2016). 
241Double tax treaties within the African countries is relatively newer concept. 
242Hearson M ‘Tax Treaties in sub-Saharan Africa: a critical review’ (2015), 09 . 
243ActionAid ‘Double Taxation Treaties in Uganda Impact and Policy Implications’ (2014) . 
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were making it difficult to do so by either giving away the taxing rights to other 
jurisdiction or leading to non-double taxation of international profits.244  
 
The process of reviewing the taxation treaty regime in Uganda is expected to 
guide and reform the country’s future treaty negotiations with other jurisdictions. 
Uganda is one of the African countries that has been affected by abuse of DTTs 
by MNEs.245 The abuse of taxation treaties with Ugandan has taken place despite 
its treaty regime being amongst the newest in the continent.  
 
A common double taxation treaty model often covers various themes. However, 
in addition to a preference of the ‘residence’246 treaty model, OECD countries 
also ensure that three specific features are indicated in their taxation treaties: 
withholding taxes, permanent establishment and tax sparing. Withholding tax is a 
provision that gives clarity in terms of imposing taxes on passive income of the 
international investors. In essence, withholding tax is levied at source base for the 
international investors, this is despite the taxation treaty being based on resident 
base. The principle of withholding tax is meant to discourage tax avoidance by 
international taxpayers using passive income to reduce their tax liabilit ies.  
 
Permanent establishment (PE), is a criterion used to determine whether the 
income derived from international investment, or part thereof, qualify to be 
classified or taxed at source base. The PE principle is important for developing 
countries where OECD model tax convention is used, or where the residence-
based taxing rights approach is adopted in a treaty. The permanent 
establishment principle or criterion or both are often used to assess how to shift 
profits and assets from source countries.247 Tax sparing248 is an arrangement in the 
DTT or any other international agreement between two contracting states where 
any tax incentives or tax relief allowed to the international investors should be 
further passed on by the resident state when imposing residence tax on the said 
international investor’s income.249   
 
                                                          
244Hearson M, (2015),09. 
245Uganda DTT abuse include: Treaty shopping and round tripping. Treaty shopping. 
246Residence base tax treaty: Residence DTT model tax refers to OECD model tax conventions, 
where income and other assets are taxed at resident of the international investor as opposed to 
the ‘source’ base or at investment host, also similar to UN model tax convention .   
247Hearson M, (2015),21-22. 
248Nilsen K The Concept of Tax Sparing (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo (2013), 8-10. 
249Hearson, M, (2015), 12.   
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a. Withholding tax 
As mostly net-capital importers, or as source countries,250 many African countries 
have mastered provisions of withholding taxes on dividends, interest payments, 
management fees and royalties paid to international investors. The withholding 
tax is often used as an anti-abuse measure251 and as a special tax rate often 
levied below the normal income tax rate and frequently differing from domestic 
taxes. Provisions for imposing withholding taxes on passive income paid to non-
residents – dividends, interest, royalties and management fees - are made in 
double taxation treaties.  
 
The Ugandan government has on overage withheld taxes of about fifteen per 
cent while both their domestic corporate and individual income tax rates are 
more than twenty-five per cent.252 Uganda’s withholding tax in taxation treaties 
has declined over the years from forty-per cent in the 1970s to fifteen per cent 
now.253 The Ugandan rates of withholding tax is similar to that of South Africa 
being fifteen per cent while Ugandan domestic corporate and individual income 
tax rates are thirty and forty per cent respectively,254 while South Africa’s 
individual and corporate tax rates are forty-five and twenty-eight per cent 
respectively.255 However, Kenya has lower withholding tax at less than ten-per 
cent while domestic tax rates for corporations and individual taxpayers are both 
at thirty per cent. 256  
 
The point being made here is that developing and net-capital importing countries 
are constantly reducing their withholding taxes rates, mainly to attract 
international investments. However, these reductions are due to continuous 
expectations from the international investors or pressure from international tax 
                                                          
250Source country, where cross-border transactions and assets takes place but are taxed from the 
international investor’s resident as opposed to source .  
251Hearson, M, (2015), 17. 
252KPMG tax rate online tool, available at https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-
tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online.html (accessed 15 May 2017). 
253Hearson, M, (2015). 
254KPMG tax rate online tool, available at https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-
tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online.html (accessed 15 May 2017). 
255 Mandy K ‘South Africa Corporate- Withholding Taxes’ available at 
http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/South-Africa-Corporate-Withholding-taxes  (accessed 28 
November 2017). 
256KPMG tax rate online tool, available at https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-
tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online.html (accessed 15 May 2017). 
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competition,257 with the expectation that lower tax rates would lead to more FDIs. 
Most of the African countries, let alone the three cases referenced in this min-
thesis, are also forced to reduce their withholding taxes in attempts to attract 
more international investments.      
 
b. Permanent establishment (PE)   
Many developing countries are source-tax states, but in their negotiations in DTTs 
settle for the OECD resident-tax model. The PE clause provides for the criteria used 
by source-tax countries for imposing taxes on some income and profits meant for 
international investors. Thus, for the source country to use PE rule to impose taxes 
on the international investor’s income and profits, four criteria are to be satisfied 
for the construction or installation of the project. Ultimately, these criteria are 
intended to establish whether assembly project or supervisory activity could give 
rise to PE and whether provision of service through employees give rise to PE or 
whether provision of services through employees amounts to PE.258   
 
According to Dauer and Krever,259 the OECD tax convention model makes a 
concession for PE. However, the concession still requires the source countries to 
assess whether a given business activity qualifies for PE. It is therefore argued that, 
as already mentioned earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this mini-thesis, 
many developing countries lack the necessary human capital and strong 
institutions to conduct these complicated PE tax assessments.  
 
Moreover, MNEs in many instances taxpayers manipulate the process, make it 
more difficult to discover and determine as to whether the business activity 
qualify as PE, while this point is also noted in the BEPS project.260 Of course, there 
is merit to using such a mechanism in determining PE, but developing countries 
will continue to endure fiscal losses if their right to tax income derived from their 
sources is unprotected at a multilateral level, more so in a MAI.   
 
In employing the four criteria noted, Uganda has its taxation treaties set a 
criterion period of six months for the building and business activities subject to PE 
taxation. This period is aligned to the criteria set out in the UN model tax 
                                                          
257International Tax Competition: Where many jurisdictions, more so within developing countries, 
compete to become the lowest tax rate regime.   
258Daurer, V and Krever, R (2014), 07. 
259Daurer, V and Krever, R (2014), 07. 
260OECD and G20, (2015).  
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convention. As a second criterion, the Uganda government has then to be able 
to ensure that it has the rights to impose tax on international investor activities, 
those specifically related to supervisory activities.  
 
Like Uganda, South African taxation treaties also use the four criteria although 
the period for international investors to be regarded as having PE varies between 
six months and twelve months. OECD countries prefers lengthy periods to allow 
them more time for exemption. Kenya261 also uses a six-months-or-more period to 
determine whether income is derived or accrued for domestic taxation.262   
 
Despite having to use this six-months-or-more period to determine whether the 
income accrued for domestic taxation or as its source, the period is too long in 
other instances. In other words, some international investors can conduct business 
activities and generate income before a period of six months ends. As one of the 
Zambian taxation authority arguing against a six-month PE period puts it, 
“The Chinese can do things in three months”263 
Like the other measures meant to be anti-abuse measures for international tax 
laws, I may therefore argue that the PE provision currently used is insufficient to 
deter the abuse of international tax rules by MNEs taxpayers. In their hope that 
they would attract more international investment, African countries are the worst 
affected by the abuse.  
 
c. Tax Sparing 
Many of the DTTs with Africa countries provide for tax sparing; in particular, those 
based on the OECD model tax convention. According to Hearson,264 one of the 
objectives of the proliferation of DTTs between EU and African countries is to 
increase tax sparing for EU states. Of course, this is due to the pass-through effect 
that such concessions in taxation treaties confer to the international investor’s 
residence country.  
 
                                                          
261Muia F ‘Permanent Establishments in Kenya’ available at 
http://www.globaltaxnetwork.co.uk/company/latest-news/permanent-establishments-in-
kenya.html  (accessed 29 May 2017). 
262Hamzaoui R, Munyandi K, Boon S ‘Withholding Tax Risks and PE Risks in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco 
and Turkey’ available at https://www.ibfd.org/Consultancy-Research/Withholding-Tax-Risks-and-
PE-Risks-Egypt-Kenya-Morocco-and-Turkey# (accessed 30 May 2017). 
263Hearson, M, (2015) 21. 
264Hearson, M, (2015). 
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The effect of tax sparing for the net-capital importers (including African countries) 
is that more tax incentives are to be given to international investors. Such tax 
incentives lead to international investment host countries foregoing taxation 
revenue. However, if African countries were also capital exporters, like most 
OECD countries, then the effect of tax sparing would be set off against similar 
relief received from other capital importers.  
 
In a separate context, tax incentives are used to attract more investment, 
including international investments.265 Tax sparing enables the international 
investors to enjoy tax incentive benefits in both their home or resident country.266 
Uganda’s taxation treaties thus provide for tax sparing. The Ugandan Ministry of 
Finance has argued that it is necessary for a tax incentive to be passed through 
to the international investor by their resident countries; failing which the resident 
country would benefit from the loss of Ugandan tax revenue.  
 
However, it is worth noting that the OECD bloc has argued against the current 
form of tax sparing in recent publications.267 The concern is that tax sparring leads 
to a rapid loss of tax base by those awarding taxation incentives; and more 
importantly, losses to its member countries. In a way, tax sparing encourages a 
bad behaviour where international investors demand tax incentives from their 
investment hosts in the DTTs. In this regard, according to the United Kingdom’s 
approach to taxation treaties, Hearson argues against tax sparring being used to 
benefit UK MNEs without the necessary and obvious benefit of securing additional 
international investment from countries that are awarded such incentives. 268  
 
Before 2005, almost all of South Africa’s DTTs provide for tax sparing for 
international investors. Subsequent to 2005, South African tax authorities 
abandoned the tax sparing clause in its double taxation treaties, as it was 
considered to be unfavourable to South African taxation policies.269 It is argued 
that, like other developing countries, having tax sparing in South African DTTs is 
meant to encourage more international investment.  
                                                          
265Hearson, M, (2015). 
266Nilsen KR The Concept of Tax Sparing: A General Analysis, and an Analysis and Assessment of the 
Various Features of Tax Sparing Provisions (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo, 2013). 
267Owens J ‘Tax Sparing, A Reconsideration’ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2090389.pdf (accessed 29 November 2017) 
268Hearson, M, (2015). 
269Hattingh J ‘South Africa’ in ‘the BRICS and the emergence of international tax coordination’ 
(2015) 259. 
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However, South Africa also plays the role of an international investor to some of 
the African countries.270 Therefore, South African MNEs might have also benefited 
from the tax sparing arrangements with countries like Mauritius, for example. 
However, it is still unclear as to whether the awarding of tax incentives or 
concessions like tax sparing will lead to more international investments for net-
capital importer countries. Table 3.1 in the chapter three shows lack of conclusive 
evidence as to whether incentives in international agreement l ike BITs, lead to 
increased investment.  
 
Despite lack of conclusion on causality between FDI inflows and taxation 
incentives, international investments to the South African economy continue to 
decline.271 However, in their studies of the effect of tax sparing on the flow of 
international investment between OECD countries and developing countries, 
Azémar and Dharmapala conclude that a year where DTT with tax sparing comes 
into force generally sees an increase of FDI of at least thirty per cent compared to 
prior years.272  
 
Kenya, like Zambia and Uganda, has in recent years reviewed its DTTs with various 
countries, for example Uganda  in 2014 stopped signing new DTTs and started 
reviewing current tax treaties273 However, contrary to Zambia and Uganda’s 
review of their taxation treaty regime to deal with abuse by MNEs leading to loss 
of tax revenues, the objective of Kenya’s review is more to use the DTTs to attract 
FDIs. Amongst other areas of review, Kenya’s DTT was to reduce tax rates for 
international investors and this is intended to increase international tax 
competition.274  
 
The Kenyan DTTs recently reviewed include those of Mauritius, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These treaties now have a 
                                                          
270South Africa more than fifty- per cent of outward international investment in 2015 went to African 
and Asian countries, according to 2016 International investment report published by UNCTAD, 12-13. 
271UNCTAD, (2016),40. 
272Azémar C and Dharmapala D ‘Tax Sparing Agreements, Territorial Tax Reforms and Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (2015) 01.  
273ActionAid ‘Double Taxation Treaties in Uganda Impact and Policy Implications’ (2014) . 
274Olingo A, ‘Kenya revises double taxation agreement to attract investors’ (2016) available at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-revises-double-taxation-agreement-to-attract-
investors/2560-3307782-ag74l5/index.html  
(accessed 03 June 2017). 
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tax sparing provision. In a sense, Kenya is hoping to attract more international 
investments by offering a tax sparring concession to its taxation treaties.  
 
In line with previous discussions of the adverse effects of concessions given by 
developing countries in double taxation treaties, I further argued that many 
developing countries fall prey to the trick of giving concessions like tax incentives. 
In some instances, these concessions lead to loss of tax revenue with the 
expectation that such losses would be compensated by an increase in 
international investment stock. Perhaps failure to give these taxation incentives 
could lead to low international investment levels. However, I argue that a lack of 
multilateral agreement or framework on international investment and 
international taxation incentivises developing countries to give away 
unaffordable concessions.   
 
4.4. OECD AND G20 BEPS PROJECT- 2014 “THE BEPS PROJECT” 
 
In 2014, G20 and OECD finance ministers and national275 leaders met to agree on 
an approach to intensify efforts that redress issues related to base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) and aggressive tax planning. Concern about the abuse of 
international taxation rules means that many countries are seeking to close tax 
revenue leakages because the global economy is yet to recover the growth 
levels experienced before the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
In particular, the OECD and G20 countries are devising a strategy to deal with 
the weakness of international taxation laws. As a result of scrutiny by the OECD 
and G20 on the double taxation treaties models, various weaknesses have been 
noted which are also in line with concerns in the taxation treaty literature. Owing 
to the era in which they were created, the current taxation treaty models – both 
OECD and UN model tax conventions - are susceptible to abuse by modern 
taxpayers. For example, double taxation treaties are meant to prevent the 
taxation of the same income twice, but now the experience is that taxpayers 
abuse the model leading to more non-taxation. Moreover, international tax rules 
                                                          
275OECD + G20 Stats: OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, German, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of 
America + G20 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Union. 
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need to be modernised since most international tax laws were developed in the 
early years of the twentieth century.276  
 
The OECD and G20 BEPS project is made up of forty-five members, which includes 
the European Union (EU) counting as one, and certain member states that are 
both individually members277 of OECD and G20 in addition to being EU members. 
Table 4.1 shows ‘individual’ country participation in the OECD and G20 BEPS 
project, worth noting that participation in decision-making mainly includes 
developed countries.278  
 
More than seventy per cent of countries involved in the project regarded as 
developed countries.279 South Africa is the only developing country from the 
African continent that is part of the BEPS project. The participation in the BEPS 
project is monopolised by EU countries, as almost half of the members are EU, G20 
and OECD members. It is quite ironic that most of the OECD and G20 countries 
have DTTs and BITs in force with many developing countries, including African 
countries. They have participated in resolving the BEPS problems, which had until 
recently affected developing countries more than others, yet they have 
excluded developing countries.  
 
According to the literature, BEPS problems are predominantly created by the 
abuse of model tax conventions and the OECD model in particular, are affecting 
African countries more as mining and extractive reliant states.280 In particular, 
countries reliant on mining and extractive industries are inherently and adversely 
affected by DTT problems. Ironically, African countries are unfairly represented in 
the OECD and G20 BEPS project. 
 
As a result of poor representation of those affected by abuse of taxation treaties, 
the BEPS project has attracted criticism from both academia and practitioners 
for failing to be more inclusive in resolving taxation treaties problems, such as loss 
                                                          
276OECD and G20 (2015).  
277EU members also have individual membership of the OECD and G20.  
278Developed countries are based on the UN 2014 report on country calcification.  
279According to the World Bank’s criterion, defines developed and developing countries . 
280 Thibedi I and Modiba S ‘The impact of BEPS on the global mining industry’ (2016) available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/footerlinks/pressreleasespage/the-impact-of-beps-on-the-
global-mining-industry.html#   
(accessed 05 June 2017). 
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of tax revenues281 also see.282 Failure to include developing countries at the origin 
of the BEPS project has justified the suspicions and aspersions being cast about 
the sustainability, relevance and practicability of the project outcome. More so, 
that the outcome of the BEPS project is intended to develop a multilateral 
instrument. However, non-OECD and non-G20 countries have been allowed to 
participate during the process of discussions regarding BEPS project, with the 
OECD and G20 providing agenda and final decisions.     
 
The OECD and G20 BEPS project has established a body (the Ad Hoc Group) to 
explore the development of a multilateral instrument (MLI) specifically on taxation 
treaty measures. According to the BEPS project, ‘the group’ is a voluntary body 
where participation from OECD and G20 countries was is voluntary, while other 
countries can also be observers.283 However, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, non-OECD and non-G20 countries284 were not permitted to 
participate in the group activities and decisions making process, but may only be 
observers.  
 
In view of the lack of inclusion of non-OECD and non-G20 countries in these 
processes, for the process outcomes (MLI) to become part of international law 
would justify the concerns for many developing countries their concerns and 
development objectives fail to be taken into account in the international rule-
making process.  
 
  
                                                          
281Oguttu, (2016).  
282Rangaprasad P ‘Should a problem for everyone be solved by the few?’ (2015) available at 
https://financialtransparency.org/should-a-problem-for-everyone-be-solved-by-the-few/ 
(accessed 02 June 2017). 
283OECD and G20, (2015).  
284Non-OECD and non-G20 countries are mainly developing or least developing countries. Many 
of which the OECD and G20 countries have DTTs in force. 
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Table 4.1. The BEPS Project Participation Matrix  
OECD and G20 BEPS 
Project  
OECD and EU 
Membership 
OECD, EU and G20 
Membership 
OECD and G20 
Membership 
The Project and 
Developing 
Countries 
The Project and 
African Countries 
Austria Austria         
Belgium Belgium         
Brazil       Brazil   
Canada     Canada     
Chile       Chile   
China       China   
Czech Republic Czech Republic         
Denmark Denmark         
Estonia Estonia         
European Union *   European Union *       
Finland Finland         
France France France France     
German German German German     
Greece Greece         
Hungary Hungary         
Iceland           
India       India   
Indonesia       Indonesia   
Ireland Ireland         
Israel       Israel   
Italy Italy Italy Italy     
Japan     Japan     
Latvia Latvia         
Luxembourg Luxembourg         
Mexico     Mexico Mexico   
Netherlands Netherlands         
New Zealand           
Norway           
Poland Poland         
Portugal Portugal         
Russia       Russia   
Saudi Arabia       Saudi Arabia   
Slovak Republic           
Slovenia Slovenia         
South Africa       South Africa South Africa 
South Korea     South Korea South Korea   
Spain Spain         
Sweden Sweden         
Switzerland           
Turkey     Turkey Turkey   
UK UK   UK     
USA     USA     
43 21 4 10 12 1 
Source: Developed by the author, from the UN dataset, 2017 
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As part of the intended outcomes, the BEPS285 project has developed fifteen 
action plans286 meant to strengthen the international taxation regime; in 
particular, dealing with aggressive tax planning and the abuse of current 
international taxation rules. Each of the individual project action-plans have led 
to fifteen different action reports released in 2015, which were then endorsed by 
Leaders and Finance Ministers of G20 and OECD countries.287 All the action 
reports are, to some extent, related to taxation treaties, while two are related 
more specifically to strengthening of the current taxation treaties: These are, 
Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, and 
Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Taxation Treaties. 
 
 Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances-
Action 06 
 
The OECD and G20 project has identified taxation treaty abuse as one of the 
principal root causes of weakness within the current International taxation 
regime. In essence, through the influence of their resident-MNEs many countries 
are accused of seeking treaty partners with lower taxation rates for international 
investors and their investments. This practice of looking for a treaty willing to 
concede to low taxation rate regimes is popularly known as ‘treaty shopping’. 
 
Treaty shopping pressurises countries that are desperate to attract and host 
international investment and MNEs to compromise their tax revenues; for 
example, by reducing their income tax rates.288 
  
                                                          
285BEPS: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
286OECD/ G20 Action plans: Action 1: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 
2:Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 3: Designing Effective 
Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions 
and Other Financial Payments, Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking 
into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in 
Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent 
Establishment Status, Actions 8-10: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Action 
11: Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 12: Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 13: Guidance 
on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 14: Making Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify 
Bilateral Tax Treaties.       
287Gurria,  A, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measure to Prevent BEPS 
Information Brochure, 2017 also at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/g20-finance-ministers-
endorse-reforms-to-the-international-tax-system-for-curbing-avoidance-by-multinational-
enterprises.htm.  
288Hearson, M, (2015), 23-25. 
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It is arguable that treaty shopping is a phenomenon that has previously affected 
developing countries, or net-capital importers. However, many developed 
countries also complain about their reduced tax bases due to some of their 
residents moving to low tax regime jurisdictions; more so after the 2008 global 
financial crisis.289 Developing countries have thus been affected more extensively 
by this phenomenon, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also noted, 
though with exceptions that the behaviour is prevalent particularly within sub-
Sahara African countries.290   
 
The OECD and G20 project has recommended three strategies to deal with 
taxation treaty abuse to be introduced in the OECD model tax convention. The 
taxation treaties should include commitments by contracting parties to avoid 
non-taxation and limit abuse; to provide for specific rules in the treaty, such as 
limitation-on-benefits of the treaty parties, to deter abuse of treaties; and to work 
under anti-abuse principles. 
 
 Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties- Action 15 
 
In the Action 15 report, the OECD and G20 BEPS project has acknowledged an 
extensive series of problems emerging from the current double taxation regime 
created by international taxation laws.291 Some of the taxation treaties models 
are outdated, with modern international business practices perpetuating the 
treaty abuses292 and exposing the irrelevancy of the treaties. The upshot is the 
abuse of taxation treaties. Although the culprits are not named mentioned, the 
report suggested a creation of a multilateral instrument to modify current treaty 
models.293  
 
The main issue that the BEPS project fails to address and is even more problematic 
for developing countries (including African countries) is the use of source-versus-
residence taxation approaches; principally, the use of UN model tax convention 
as opposed to OECD model tax convention. Although the report recognises that 
                                                          
289Cooper, G, Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse, 2014, Papers on Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base 
of Developing Countries, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs United Nations 
Secretariat, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP2/Paper_PreventingTaxTreatyAbuse.pdf.   
290Ali-Abbas S. M, Klemm A, Bedi S, and Park J ‘A Partial Race to the Bottom: Corporate Tax 
Developments in Emerging and Developing Economies’ (2012) IMF Working Paper WP/12/28, 22  
291 OECD, (2015), 18-20. 
292Abuse of tax treaty includes creating double non-taxation.  
293Treaty model being modified is the OECD model tax convention. 
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the OECD model tax convention needs to be reviewed,294 the report falls short of 
mentioning that the model leads to taxation base erosion for net-capital 
importers of whom the majority are developing countries. The conclusion of the 
Action 15 report recommends the development of the MLI and this multilateral 
instrument was supported by sixty-eight different jurisdiction signatories in July 
2017.295  
 
To motivate the development of the MLI, the report correctly noted that 
developing countries lack necessary specialists as far as negotiating the double 
taxation treaties is concerned.296 In fact, developing countries make use of the 
expertise of their anticipated counterparts to negotiate taxation treaties on their 
behalf. No doubt, a multilateral instrument would certainly aid many developing 
countries if key issues like loss of tax revenue and others were to be addressed in 
this MLI. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION  
 
The double taxation treaty regime has evolved over the years. However, such 
developments are, in part, aligned to improvements within international 
investment law, which indeed makes sense. Over the years of continual growth 
in both international investment and development of taxation rules, the 
contestation of a preferable approach lines has always been drawn between 
satisfying the needs of the net-capital exporting and those of the net-capital 
importing countries – in reality, a conflict between the interests of developing and 
developed states.  
 
The analysis provided in this chapter shows that developing or net-capital 
importing countries often concede to unfavourable taxation treaties, such as the 
use of OECD model provisions that prevents the imposition of taxes on the source-
base to attract more international investment. These concessions are made 
despite such treaties. This leads to the erosion of revenue tax bases and because 
some developing countries lack sufficient human capital capacity and strong 
institutions to track international investors’ business activities that are worth 
                                                          
294OECD, (2015),18. 
295EY Signing by 68 jurisdictions of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent BEPS highlights impacts for business to consider, (2017) 
EY Global Tax Alert Library. 
296OECD, (2015). 
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taxing.297 also see.298 Furthermore, developing countries continue to follow 
unfavourable taxation models with the intention to attract more international 
investment, despite inconclusive evidence supporting their hope of attracting 
more international investments. 
 
Pursuing unfavourable taxation treaty models has less to do with the intention to 
attract international investments, but ensuring better infrastructure development 
or job creation or providing certainty in taxation rules. Thus, developing countries 
and African countries in particular may have either to foster a multilateral accord 
on international investments which also strengthens taxation rules or revert to 
strengthen their unilateral or regional legislative framework to support their 
development objectives. Supporting an inclusive multilateral accord or use of 
unilateral or regional framework is more important because the current 
international legislative framework is less supportive of their development 
objectives than relying on own domestic legislation.299  
 
The proposed OECD multilateral convention to implement tax treaty related 
measures (MLI) makes provision to address the abuse of double taxation treaties 
but few developing countries are currently signing up for it. The MLI is seen by 
many as a better approach towards reforming international tax rules, such as 
introducing anti-treaty abuse measures. However, certain critics argue that OECD 
countries’ tax-related problems might not be similar to those in developing 
countries, so questioning the OECD’s legitimacy to house MLI. The instrument also 
fails to address base erosion as one of the main problems affecting developing 
countries, seeing that many developing countries use a sources-taxation 
approach.  
In chapter five, we will conclude this mini-thesis by providing recommendations 
for mechanisms to be considered in a multilateral investment agreement to 
address international taxation rule abuses and deal with development concerns 
raised by developing countries. The recommendations responding to this mini -
thesis’ research questions are also set out in chapter one   
 
                                                          
297Daurer V and Krever,R (2014), 06. 
298Peter C, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/ OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, (2015) Bulletin for International Taxation, 379.  
299UNCTAD Towards a new generation of international investment policies: UNCTAD’s fresh 
approach to multilateral investment policy-making’ (2016), 23 (1). 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
77 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT MIGHT WORK FOR AFRICAN AND OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This mini-thesis has been partly motivated by an investigation of the ongoing 
international discussion of the effects of a delayed global economic recovery 
since the 2008 global financial crisis. There has clearly been a negative effect on 
many countries’ economic growth and, in particular, a decline or lack of growth 
in many governments’ tax revenues. Further impetus for this study was provided 
by the recent wave of perceived protectionism300 passing through the global 
economy, one resuscitating an “old discussion” as to whether international 
investments require a multilateral governance structure.  
 
This discourse also serves to introduce a question as to whether current 
international taxation law relating to taxing-rights is favourable for both 
international investors and host countries.301 also see.302 This mini-thesis has thus 
analysed the various attempts to pursue a multilateral investment regulatory 
framework and highlighted areas that need strengthening in the current 
international regulatory framework related to international investment.   
 
This chapter provides recommendations for realistic changes to the international 
investment and taxation regulatory framework to deal with concerns of 
developing countries about development objectives - African countries in 
particular. The main objective of this mini-thesis is to review the current 
international investment regime and determine whether a multilateral investment 
agreement is desirable, one with special clauses providing for the international 
taxation regulatory framework and so balancing the needs of both developing 
and developed countries.  
 
My analysis of the literature on bilateral investment treaties and other investment 
regulatory frameworks, including double taxation treaties, has revealed common 
challenges such as a lack of inclusion or consideration of development objectives 
of developing countries and international taxation rules that leads to fiscal losses 
                                                          
300Many developed countries are perceived to be advancing protectionism, like the UK with Brexit 
and the USA for voting in Donald Trump as President who is perceived to pursue a protectionist 
policy, while the French 2017 election candidate Le Pen promised Frexit .  
301 UNCTAD, (1996). 
302 Oguttu A, (2016). 
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or redistribution of the tax base to developed states, or residents state of 
international investors.  
 
These challenges are experienced predominantly by international net-capital 
importing countries rather than developed or international net-capital exporters. 
However, there are also clear indications that some of the challenges, are 
inherent to the structures of the international economic system such as the lack 
of strong institutions to negotiate or implement favourable international 
investment and taxation laws within many developing countries.  
 
More importantly, there is also a continuing narrative that  the global political-
economic-social setting does affect the calibre of the international investment 
and the regulatory taxation framework.303 To take some examples, prior to World 
War II the League of Nations was able to produce a model tax convention, the 
Mexico model,304 which seemed to have been influenced more by developing 
countries since developed countries were preoccupied with the build-up to war.  
 
After the war, developed countries started to influence the review of such model 
and advocate for the London Model, which was further developed to become 
the model OECD model tax convention. The emergence of the London model 
took place within the same era where the initiation of development of the 
international investment regulatory framework took-off.305 However, as 
international trade and investments grew in the era coined post-colonial, more 
and more international bilateral investment and taxation agreements also grew, 
strengthening international law towards the mid-1980s.  
 
There has always been the intent to establish these rules at the multilateral level. 
Multilateral approach was attempted as far back as the 1948 proposal of the 
Havana Charter and were later cited by a ruling at the International Court of 
Justice in the Barcelona Traction Case,306 where the need for multilateral rules on 
protection of international investors was recommended. The OECD made another 
plurilateral attempt at an MAI via around the late 1990s, which also failed to garner 
enough support. The 2008 global financial crisis has also led to many countries losing 
                                                          
303UNCTAD, (2015). 
304Daurer V and Krever,R (2014). 
305UNCTAD, (2015).  
306Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I.CJ. Rep. 3. 
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tax revenues to deal with the effects of the crisis due to lower economic growth. The 
experience of global financial crisis might lead to an international discourse as to 
whether the current international economic regulatory framework and taxation rules 
in particular are fit for purposes. This discourse has led to another attempt to 
strengthen the international economic regulatory framework, now called the OECD 
and G20 2014 BEPS project.  
 
The analysis of literature and international economic regulatory framework has 
revealed that the participation of developing countries has been limited, in most 
instances, to a few countries like South Africa, China, India and Brazil. For example, 
the development of the UN model tax convention, which is meant to include the 
views of developing countries for fewer African countries in the sub-committees that 
developed the model.307 The recent process by the OECD and G20 BEPS project is 
criticised for failing to include developing countries,308 despite current international 
taxation framework’s adverse consequences for tax revenues of these countries. 
There is also a lack of human capital and strong institutions which certainly limits some 
of the developing countries’ capacity to participate in international processes of 
developing and updating existing international regulatory frameworks.    
 
The mini-thesis has explored various international legal frameworks that may be 
applied to strengthen the current international investment legal system. In particular, 
an assessment is required of whether a multilateral agreement on investment is 
desirable to protect the interests of developing countries, including ensuring that the 
development objectives of developing countries is taken into account when setting 
rules and there are limits in terms of tax base redistribution as far as developing 
countries are concerned. The mini-thesis has thus sought to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
 Do the IIAs and DTTs serving African countries (for example, Kenya, South 
African and Uganda) support investment host country development 
objectives? 
 Is there adequate co-ordination between DTTs and lIA with African countries 
(for example, Kenya, South African and Uganda) and how could a MAI 
strengthen harmonisation? 
                                                          
307Hearson, M, (2015), 31. 
308Oguttu, (2016). 
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 How could a MAI (or a framework) strengthen DTTs to benefit the international 
investment host; in particular, developing countries in Africa?  
 
5.2. CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The objectives of the international investment and taxation rules have been set 
out and ‘agreed’ to. However, in practice there are inconsistencies in 
implementing such laws insofar as some MNEs manipulate the rules and 
developing countries often lack human and institutional capacity to uphold 
implementation. It would appear that rather than having a fairer system, 
international investors or capital exporters, predominately OECD members, desire 
consistent international investment rules and regulatory framework that protect 
their investments and returns at all costs. However, international investment hosts 
are more concerned about attracting as much international investments as 
possible while, to a greater extent, it would seem that having fairer rules has been 
a secondary factor, but not anymore.  
 
There is inconclusive evidence that, if adhered to, the current international 
investment legal framework has led to more FDIs, Table 3.1 in chapter three shows 
inconclusive evidence. This is probably one of the reasons why developing 
countries, including African Union member states, seek to review the rules 
governing investments coming to the continent. This is to ensure that the AU 
member states’ development agendas are taken into account during the rule-
making process.  
 
In reviewing the international investment and taxation rules, the AU may consider 
the main analysis finding of this mini-thesis to be that current BITs and DTTs protect 
international investors’ interest more than those of host countries. Whether this is 
deliberate or not, the current international investment and taxation treaties are 
created to encourage more FDI. Unfortunately, this means offering more 
concessions and incentives to international investors.  
 
Ironically, the international agreements (BITs and DTT) are mainly concluded 
between the contracting states who would then act to implement them. The 
process of negotiating these agreements thus allows contracting parties to raise 
issues of importance; that is, developing countries would have to ensure that their 
development objectives are taken into account.   
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5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The analysis provided by this mini-thesis has identified various weaknesses and 
some strengths within the current international investment and taxation treaties, 
outcomes that are mainly supported by the literature. It is therefore 
recommended that the following intervention will strengthen the current 
international governance structure in support of a multilateral agreement on 
investment with specific and fair taxation rules.   
 
a. Multilateral Institutions to pursue international agreement on investment 
Multilateral institutions such as the WTO, WB, IMF and UNCTAD are to reconsider 
the previous positions that they have held regarding a MAI. They ought to play a 
more strategic and leadership role in fostering the development of an accord 
regarding standardising and harmonising international investment and taxation 
rules. Of course, in many instances, the multilateral institutions play a coordinating 
role.   
 
However, if these institutions are to be effective and remain relevant in the 
twenty-first century they should be required to address challenges that are 
inherently affecting developing countries under the current international 
regulatory framework. These include lack of human capital and strong institutions 
to negotiate and implement an international regulatory framework without 
compromise. If a multilateral agreement on investment is to be beneficial to 
developing countries and African countries in particular, it should contain a 
clause that emphasises the deliberate balance between the interest of the 
international investors and the development objectives of the international 
investment host and other domestic objectives. Multilateral institutions should be 
empowered to create dispute mechanism that protect both the development 
objectives of investment hosts and the interests of the international investors.    
 
b. Unilateral policy over bilateral treaties 
Many developing countries,309 and some developed countries are withdrawing 
from their long standing bilateral investment treaties,310 instead opting for 
                                                          
309AU has also considering how to withdraw from current BITs with developed countries, due to 
their failure to support the continent development objectives. 
310Uribe D ‘Ecuador withdraws from its remaining investment treaties’ (2017) available at 
http://us5.campaign-archive1.com/?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=2e104d965b  
(Accessed 25 May 2017). 
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domestic legislation over investment. Recently Ecuador and South Africa found 
themselves amongst the countries to withdraw from their BITs and developing 
domestic legislation in this regard. This approach of withdrawing from 
international frameworks may fail to reform the attitude of developed countries 
in the short term, whose unfair behaviour are often cited as reasons for the 
terminations of BITs. 
 
Certainly, in the long run many developed countries may find it difficult to invest 
in developing countries without complying with domestic investment laws. More 
so, these domestic legislations are meant to address their developmental 
objectives, which some BITs fail to protect. It is therefore worrying that more and 
more developing countries should withdraw from the current BITs as a means of 
influencing a multilateral investment agreement.  
 
This approach may not, in the first place, create fair outcomes for international 
investors, but it could certainly lead to more international investors  being forced 
to adhere to or at least be aware of developing countries’ interest, more so that 
there is not a consistent rationale to international investment decisions. BITs have 
to a greater extent provided certainty and consistency to many international 
investments; in particular, those related to dispute settlements. However, a 
unilateral legislative framework for developing countries, or least at regional level, 
could strengthen their bargaining power for international investments.       
 
c. Regional bodies to be used- African countries perspectives 
 
Developing countries and African countries in particular may consider 
strengthening human capital and strong institutions at regional level. Such 
regional capacity should be used to negotiate international agreements with 
other countries, instead of individual AU member states. The process could be 
more beneficial in the case of countries with limited human capital and strong 
institutions.  
 
The AU regions have negotiated some of its regional treaties together with 
investment chapters. However, member countries often go ahead and negotiate 
BITs individually. The use of regions as a common voice for all member states may 
in appearance and in practice provide a strong negotiation mandate for the 
regions and the continent at large.   
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d. Domestic investment legal framework and support for taxation competition 
 
If a multilateral institution fails to develop or coordinate the development of a 
binding multilateral investment agreement with fair taxation rules, then 
developing countries would better be served by domestic investment legislation 
as well as reconsidering their involvement with current international cooperation 
on taxation.  
 
Fairer taxation rules could include, consideration that redistributing tax base of 
international investment hosts should be limited to the initial investment made, or 
there should be a timing-limit for the redistributing tax base, or the relation of 
taxation rules to attract investments should be supported by evidence. More so 
that international cooperation on taxation serves the interest of the net-capital 
exporting countries rather than that of developing countries by eliminating tax 
competition.311 Also fairer taxation rule to consider, the United Nations has a 
taxation division, of course the purpose is unique though it includes exploring 
measures to redress abuse of international taxation rules abuse. Since the 
taxation rules are often more unique to country specifics than investment rules, 
developing countries without human capital or strong institutions should be 
allowed to consider having access to UN specialist without or limited costs when 
negotiating taxation agreements. 
 
In a way, the withdrawal of developing countries’ participation in international 
taxation cooperation may exaggerate taxation competition. According to 
Dagan,312 taxation competition has a potential to attract more international 
investment to a lower tax rate regime. Having a low tax rate regime could mainly 
benefit the host country, if low tax revenue is a secondary objective rather than 
jobs creation or the development of infrastructure. Therefore, tax competition is 
considered harmful by developed countries because MNEs moving their offices 
to low tax jurisdictions leads to non-taxation and the low tax regimes are mostly 
non-OECD countries.   
 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, I do recommend that further research investigates how to strengthen 
the current international economic cooperation led by multilateral institution(s) to 
                                                          
311Dagan, T (2015), 21-22. 
312Dagan, T (2015), 21-22.  
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ensure a fairer international legal framework in this regard. It is in the interest of both 
developed and developing countries that such a process is undertaken to avoid 
many countries returning a regressive dependency on their domestic legal framework 
as far as international economic activities are concerned.    
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APPENDIX LIST 
Appendix A:  Substantive Issues covered in the OECD BIT Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
86 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
87 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOKS  
Chang HJ and Grabel I, Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic 
Policy Manual (2004) London Zed Books. 
 
BOOK CHAPTERS 
Dubut T, ‘The International Tax Policy of the Least Developed Countries: The Case of 
the Partner States of the East African Community – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda’ in Brauner Y and Pistone P, BRICS and the Emergence of International 
Tax Coordination (2015) Amsterdam:  IBFD books.  
 
Hattingh J ‘South Africa’ in Brauner Y and Pistone P BRICS and the Emergence of 
International Tax Coordination) (2015) Amsterdam:  IBFD books. 
 
Dagan, T ‘BRICS: Theoretical Framework and the Potential of Cooperation’ in 
Brauner Y and Pistone P BRICS and the Emergence of International Tax Coordination) 
(2015) Amsterdam:  IBFD books.  
 
CASES 
Barcelona Traction Case, 1970 I.CJ. Rep. 3. 
 
Right of Passage Case (India v. Port.), 1960 ICJ Rep. 4, 39. 
 
Foresti Case No ARB(AF)/07/1. 
 
CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES 
Havana Charter, (1947).  
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Taxation 
Convention, (1963).  
 
United Nations Model Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries, (2011). 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (1969) 8 ILM 679. 
 
United States-Switzerland Estate and Inheritance Tax Treaty, (1959), 9/17/51. 
 
INTERNET SOURCES 
Arnold A ‘An introduction to tax treaties’ available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-ontent/uploads/2015/10/TT_Introduction_Eng.pdf 
(accessed 06 January 2017). 
 
Baker P ‘An analysis of double taxation treaties and their effect on foreign direct 
investment’ (unpublished paper, University of Cambridge’ available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/events/seminars-
schedule/conferences/peuk12/paul_l__baker_dtts_on_fdi_23_may_2012.pdf  (accessed 
29 December 2016). 
 
Baxter R ‘The global economic crisis and its impact on South Africa and the 
country’s mining industry’ available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/51/Roger+Baxter
.pdf  (accessed 15 January 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
88 
 
Brunton L ‘The OECD/G20 Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project- Informed 
perspective’ The SAIT 19 October 2015 available at 
http://www.thesait.org.za/news/255947/The-OECDG20-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-
BEPS-project--an-informed-perspective.htm (accessed 01 November 2017). 
 
Kasoko E ‘Why and how Africa should extend its network of double taxation 
treaties with China’ available at https://africlaw.com/2014/03/17/why-and-how-
africa-should-extend-its-network-of-double-taxation-treaties-with-china/ 
(accessed April 2017). 
 
KPMG tax rate online tool, available at 
https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-
online.html (accessed 15 May 2017). 
 
Mandy K ‘South Africa Corporate- Withholding Taxes’ available at PWC 30 
October 2017 available at http://taxsummaries.pwc.com/ID/South-Africa-Corporate-
Withholding-taxes  (accessed 28 November 2017). 
 
Muia F ‘Permanent Establishments in Kenya’ available at 
http://www.globaltaxnetwork.co.uk/company/latest-news/permanent-establishments-
in-kenya.html (accessed 29 May 2017). 
 
Hamzaoui R, Munyandi K, Boon S ‘Withholding Tax Risks and PE Risks in Egypt, 
Kenya, Morocco and Turkey’ available at https://www.ibfd.org/Consultancy-
Research/Withholding-Tax-Risks-and-PE-Risks-Egypt-Kenya-Morocco-and-Turkey# 
(accessed 30 May 2017). 
 
Olingo A ‘Kenya revises double taxation agreement to attract investors’ 
available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Kenya-revises-double-taxation-
agreement-to-attract-investors/2560-3307782-ag74l5/index.html  
(accessed 03 June 2017). 
 
Phiri D ‘Zambia headed for sovereign debt crisis, Zambian Watchdog’ available 
at https://www.zambiawatchdog.com/zambia-headed-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-
fundanga/comment-page-1/    (accessed 23 March 2017). 
 
Rangaprasad P ‘Should a problem for everyone be solved by the few?’ 
available at https://financialtransparency.org/should-a-problem-for-everyone-be-
solved-by-the-few/ (accessed 15 June 2017). 
 
Thibedi I and Modiba S ‘The impact of BEPS on the global mining industry’ 
available at https://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/footerlinks/pressreleasespage/the-
impact-of-beps-on-the-global-mining-industry.html#   
(accessed 05 June 2017). 
 
Uribe D ‘Ecuador withdraws from its remaining investment treaties’ available at 
http://www.alainet.org/es/node/185697 (accessed 25 May 2017). 
 
WTO ‘Trade and Investment, World Trade Organisation’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm (accessed 15 January 
2017). 
 
UNECA ‘Investment agreements landscape in Africa, 2015, Committee on 
Regional Cooperation and Integration’ available at 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
89 
 
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-documents/RITD/2015/CRCI-
Oct2015/report-on-investment-agreements.pdf (accessed 04 March 2017).  
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES  
Arnold J ‘Tax Treaty Monito, the UN Model in Practice’ (2014) Bulletin for 
International Taxation with IBFD Tax Treaty Unit, 118-146. 
 
Åslund A ‘The World Needs a Multilateral Investment Agreement’ (2013), Policy 
Brief, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1-8. 
 
Avi-Yonay R ‘A perspective of supra-nationality in tax law’ in BRICS and the 
emergence of international tax coordination (2015), International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation.  
 
Azémar C and Dharmapala D ‘Tax Sparing Agreements, Territorial Tax Reforms, and 
Foreign Direct Investment’ (2015) Bulleting for International taxation with IBFD Tax 
Treaty Unit, 310-321. 
 
Ault HJ and Arnold BJ ‘Protecting the tax base of developing countries: an overview’ 
(2015) United Nations Handbook Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries. 
 
Barthel F, Busse M and Neumayer E, ‘The impact of double taxation treaties on 
foreign direct investment: evidence from large dyadic panel data, 
Contemporary economic policy (2009) 28 (3) Contemporary Economic Policy 
366-377. 
 
Berger A ‘Do we really need a Multilateral Investment Agreement?’ (2013) 
German Development Institute. 
 
Busse M, Königer J and Nunnenkamp, P ‘FDI Promotion through Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: More Than a Bit?’ (2010) Review of World Economics 146  (1) 
147-177. 
 
Carim X ‘International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural 
Transformation: A perspective from South Africa’ (2015) 4 (03) Investment Policy 
Brief. 
 
Cooper G S ‘Preventing Tax Treaty Abuse’ (2014) United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Paris.   
 
Drabek J ‘A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Convincing the Sceptics’ 
(1998) World Trade Organization Economic Research and Analysis Division: 
Genève. 
 
Dagan T ‘The tax treaties myth’ (2000) 32 (939), International Law and Politics 
Journal, 1-53. 
 
Daurer V and Krever R ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy models: 
an African Case Study’ (2014) 22(1) African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 1-21. 
 
Godwin A and Schmulow, A ‘The Financial Sector Regulat ion Bill in South Africa: 
Lessons from Australia’ (2015) 52/2015 CIFR.  
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
90 
 
Hallward-Driemeier M ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment?’ (2003) 33(10) World Development), 1567-1585. 
 
Hearson M ‘Developing Countries’ Role in International Tax Cooperation’ (2017), 
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four –G24. 
 
Hearson M ‘Tax treaties in sub-Sahara Africa: a critical review’ (2015) Tax Justice 
Network African, 
 
Houde M ‘Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2006) OECD 
International Investment Perspectives, 143-181. 
 
Kavaljit S ‘Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO’ (2003) Asia-Pacific 
Research Network: Manila. 
 
Kishoiyian B ‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of 
Customary International Law’ (1993) 14 (2) North Western Journal of International 
Law & Business. 
 
Lennard M ‘The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention – Current Points of Difference and Recent Developments’ (2009) Asia-
Pacific Tax Bulleting.    
 
Malik M ‘South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties:  The same old story?’ 2010  IV 
Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators  Background 
Papers, 1-8. 
 
Marian O ‘Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse: A Functional Approach’ 
(2016) 41(3) University of Florida Law Faculty Publications 1157-1183. 
 
Mosoti V ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral 
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in 
Between?’ (2005), 26(1) Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 
95-138. 
 
Neumayer, E ‘Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to 
developing countries?’ (2007), 43 (8) JDS, 1501-1519. 
 
Oguttu A ‘Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa- Part 1: Africa’s Response 
to the OECD BEPS Action Plan (2016) 54 ICTD Working Paper 18.   
 
Oguttu A ‘Tax base erosion and profit shifting – part 2: a critique of some priority 
OECD action points from an African perspective – preventing excessive interest 
deductions and tax treaty abuse’ (2016) 49 (1) Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 154-156. 
 
Peter C, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/ OECD Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (2015) Bulletin for International Taxation, 375-381.  
 
Sauvé J ‘Multilateral rules on investment: is forward movement possible?’ (2006) 9(2) 
Journal of International Economic Law, 325–355. 
 
Sauvant K ‘The regulatory framework for investment: where  are we headed?’ 
(2011) 15 Research in Global Strategic Management, 407-433. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
91 
 
Salacuse J ‘Historical Background of Tritification’ (2015) in, The Law of 
Investment Treaties Oxford International Law Library, 97. 
 
Sullivan N and Salacuse J ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 (1) , 67-130. 
   
Steenkamp L ‘The Permanent Establishment Concept in double Tax Agreement 
Between Developed and Developing Countries…’ (2014) 13(3), International 
Journal of Economic and Business Research, 539-551. 
 
Vogel K ‘Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation’ (1986) 4 (1) Spring Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 10. 
 
Vandevelde, K ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 
Journal of International Law and Policy, University of California at Davis 157–194.  
 
LEGISLATION 
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015. 
Department of Trade and Industry notice 958 of 2016, Regulation in Terms of the 
Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015. 
 
REPORTS AND POLICIES OF GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 
ActionAid, Double Taxation Treaties in Uganda, (2014). 
 
African Development Bank ‘African Economic Outlook 2015 Regional 
Development and Spatial Inclusion (2015). 
 
AU, Report of the meeting of trade senior officials. Eight ordinary session of the 
conference of the AU ministers of the trade, Addis Ababa. 
 
Development Policy and Analysis Division (DPAD), Country classification, Data 
sources, country classifications and aggregation methodology, 2014 World 
Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP). 
 
Ali-Abbas S. M, Klemm A, Bedi S, and Park J, ‘A Partial Race to the Bottom: 
Corporate Tax Developments in Emerging and Developing Economies’  (2012) 
IMF Working Paper WP/12/28, 22.  
 
OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment contemporary to the 
consolidated text (1998). 
 
OECD Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft Consolidated Text, (1998) (98)7/REV1 
DAFFE/MAI.  
 
OECD Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties- 
Action 15 - 2015 Final Report (2015) OECD and G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project: Paris. 
 
OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (2013) Paris. 
 
OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, Action 6 - 2015 Final Report Action 06 - 2015 Final Report (2015) 
OECD and G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project: Paris. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
92 
 
UNCTAD ‘Towards a new generation of international investment policies: 
UNCTAD’s fresh approach to multi lateral investment policy-making’ (2016), 23 
(1) Transnational Corporations.  
 
UNCTAD, World report on Investment Investment, Trade and International Policy 
Arrangements (1996) UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION, New York. 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance- Reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu  
 (2015). 
 
UCTAD, Economic Development in African, Rethinking the Role of the Foreign 
Direct Investment, 2005, 34. 
 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Manual for the 
Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries 
(2003) Division for Public Administration and Development Management, New York. 
 
UNCTAD, ‘reforming the International Investment Regime: An Action Menu’ (2015) in 
World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 120-
173. 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) - Investment Policies 
and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: Implications for the Regional 
Integration (2016) Addis Ababa.  
 
WEF Foreign Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The 
Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (2013) Geneva. 
 
THESIS 
Davids T, A principled evaluation of the effectiveness of selected aspects of the 
OECD’s BEPS proposals to prevent “tax treaty abuse” (unpublished MCOM thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 2015). 
 
Nilsen K, The Concept of Tax Sparing (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Oslo) 
(2013). 
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
